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Preface
Economists tend to favor the free ow of capital across national borders,
because it allows capital to seek out the highest rate of return. They also
o¤er several other advantages . First, they reduce the risk faced by owners of
capital by allowing them to diversify their lending and investment. Second,
the global integration of capital markets can contribute to the spread of best
practices in corporate governance, accounting standards, and legal traditions.
Third, the global mobility of capital limits the ability of governments to
pursue bad policies.
Capital can ow across countries in a variety of ways. One can distinguish
among three major ones: foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio
investment and loans. Among all these types, FDI, which involves a lasting
interest and control, stands out. The world ows of FDI rose about sevenfold
(in current U.S. dollars) over the 1990s; the vast majority is owed between
developed countries, but there are recently increased ows into emerging
markets.
This book provides a treatise of the unique features of FDI ows, covering
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both theory and data. It focuses on the determinants of the aggregate ows
of FDI at the source-host country level.
The book is likely to nd its main readership among academics, graduate
students, and trained policy professionals. The level of analysis is appropriate
for an advanced graduate course, and could be accessible to anyone with some
graduate training in economics. The book is also relatively self contained,
including a special chapter reviewing the econometric techniques used, which
means that reader do not necessarily have to consult other reference books.
The scope is particular to the topic studied. As a result, it could nd
some use as a textbook in a course specially designed to study foreign direct
investment. Also, chapters of the book can be assigned as readings in a
broader based international nance course.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no other books covering the same
subject matter. There has been a great deal of work studying FDI from a mi-
cro or trade based perspective, but little has focused on the macroeconomics
of FDI. The existing macroeconomic literature, available mostly in research
papers (other than a book form), tends to focus on FDI to developing coun-
tries. As a result, this book can be expected to ll a niche in the literature
on FDI.
In writing this book, we greatly benetted from previous collaborations.
Specically, chapter two is based on Goldstein and Razin (2006). We thank
Itay Goldstein for allowing us to use this work in the book. Part two and
Chapter Nine are based, respectively, on Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004
PREFACE xv
and 2005). We thank Yona Rubinstein for allowing us to use these works in
the book. Chapter Eight is based on the unpublished paper of Razin, Sadka
and Tong (2005). We thank Hui Tong for this collaboration. Chapter Three
is based on our previous research, Razin and Sadka (forthcoming).
Financial support from the Bernard A. Schwartz Program in the Political
Economy of Free Markets at Tel-Aviv University is gratefully acknowledged.
Part of this book was written while Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka were
visiting the CEFSifo Institute, Munich, which provided us with an excellent
research environment and warm hospitality.
We are indebted to two anonymous reviewers of Princeton University
Press for many insightful comments and suggestions that improved the qual-
ity of the "nal product". Special thanks are due to our Ph. D. student,
Alon Cohen, who provided an excellent research assistance in the estimation
results of Chapter Nine and the simulation results of Chapters Five and Ten.
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Chapter 1
Overview
Economists tend to favor the free ow of capital across national borders,
because it allows capital to seek out the highest rate of return. Unrestricted
capital ows may also o¤er several advantages, as noted by Feldstein (2000).
First, international ows reduce the risk faced by owners of capital by al-
lowing them to diversify their lending and investment. Second, the global
integration of capital markets can contribute to the spread of best practices
in corporate governance, accounting standards, and legal traditions. Third,
the global mobility of capital limits the ability of governments to pursue bad
policies.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1 Channels of International Capital Flows
Capital can ow across countries in a variety of ways. One can distinguish
among three major ones: foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio
investment (FPI) and loans. FDI is dened as an investment involving a long
term relationship and reecting a lasting interest and control of a resident
entity in the source country (foreign direct investor or parent rm) in the
host country.
In national and international accounting standards, FDI is dened as in-
volving an equity stake of 10% or more. In general, FDI itself has three
components: equity capital, intra-rm loans and reinvestment of retained
earnings. Because di¤erent countries have di¤erent recording practices relat-
ing to these three components, there arise some measurement problems1. Not
all countries follow the 10% mark for the denition of FDI. Most countries do
indeed report long-term intra-rm loans, but not all countries report short-
term loans. Most countries report reinvestment of retained earning only with
a considerable lag. One implication of these measurement problems is that
FDI inows do not contemporaneously match FDI outows.
Foreign portfolio investment is di¤erent from FDI in that it lacks the el-
ement of lasting interest and control. Foreign portfolio investment includes
also lending in the form of tradable bonds. The third type of foreign invest-
ment is loan, primarily bank loans.
Among these types of foreign investment ows, FDI stands out. The
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world ows of FDI rose about sevenfold in current U.S. dollars over the
1990s (see Figure 1.1, A and B)2. Furthermore, the vast majority of these
ows are among OECD countries. FDI ows from OECD to non-OECD
countries are also signicant (see Table 1.1).3 Maurice Obtfeld and Alan M.
Taylor (2002) make a succinct observation: "A century ago, world income
and productivity levels were far less divergent than they are today, so it is
all the more remarkable that so much capital was directed to countries at or
below the 20 percent and 40 percent income levels (relative to the United
States). Today, a much larger fraction of the worlds output and population
is located in such low-productivity regions, but a smaller share of global
foreign investment reaches them."
(Figure 1.1 A&B about here)
(Table 1.1 about here)
The U.N. (2005) annual report on world investment documents how
countries are becoming more receptive to FDI. Table 1.2, which refers to the
years 1991-2004, shows that the vast majority of changes in laws and regula-
tions pertaining to investment were more favorable to FDI. An exception is
developing countries which introduced some laws and regulations intended to
protect some natural resources (especially in the energy eld) against "foreign
intruders"4. The report also indicates that countries are cooperating with
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each other in designing pro-FDI bilateral policies: "The number of bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs) reached
2,392 and 2,559 respectively, in 2004, with developing countries concluding
more such treaties with other developing countries."
(Table 1.2 about here)
This book focuses on the unique features of FDI, vis-a-vis other types of
capital ows.
1.2 Micro Level Studies
Studies of FDI can essentially be divided into two main categories: micro
level (industrial organization and international trade) studies and macro-
nance studies. Initially, the literature that explained FDI in microeconomics
terms focused on market imperfections, and on the desire of multinational
enterprises to expand their market power; see, for instance, Caves (1971).
Subsequent literature centered more on rm-specic advantages, owing to
product superiority or cost advantages, stemming from economies of scale,
multi-plants economies and advanced technologies, or superior marketing and
distribution; see, for instance, Helpman (1984).
A multinational may nd it cheaper to expand directly in a foreign coun-
try, rather than through trade, in cases where its advantages stem from
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internal, indivisible assets associated with knowledge and technology.5 The
latter form of FDI is referred to as horizontal FDI. Note therefore that hori-
zontal FDI is a substitute for exports. Brainard (1997) employs a di¤erenti-
ated product framework to provide an empirical support for this hypothesis.
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) incorporate intraindustry heterogeneity
to conclude, among other things, that FDI plays a lesser role in substituting
for exports in industries with large productivity dispersion.
However, horizontal FDI is not the only form of FDI. Multinational cor-
porations account for a very signicant fraction of world trade ows, with
trade in intermediate inputs between divisions of the same rm constitut-
ing an important portion of these ows; see, for instance, Hanson, Mataloni
and Slaughter (2001). This is referred to as vertical FDI.6 One of the key
determinants of vertical FDI is the abundance of human capital; see Antras
(2004) for a comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatise of the various
forms of FDI.
In a recent survey, Helpman (2006) observes that between 1990 and 2001
sales by foreign a¢ liates of multinational corporations expanded much faster
than exports of goods and nonfactor services. He also points out that the
fast expansion of trade in services has been accompanied by fast-growing
trade in inputs. Furthermore: "...the growth of input trade has taken place
both within and across the boundaries of the rm, i.e., as intra-rm and
arms-length trade." In light of these developments, Helpman argues that
"the traditional classication of FDI into vertical and horizontal forms has
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become less meaningful in practice." Indeed, his survey includes some new
applications of the theory of the organization of the rm to analyze the
patterns of exports, FDI, outsourcing, etc.
1.3 Macro-Finance Studies
FDI combines not only aspects of international trade in goods and services
but also aspects of international nancial ows. The macro-nance liter-
ature attempts to analyze the composition of aggregate international ows
into FDI, FPI and bank loans, as well as the breakdown of the aggregate ow
of FDI according to either modes of entry or modes of nance. As with re-
spect to the modes of entry, FDI can be made either at the greeneld stage or
in the form of purchasing ongoing rms (Mergers and Acquisitions - M&A).
U.N. (2005) observes that "the choice of mode is inuenced by industry - spe-
cic factors. For example, greeneld investment is more likely to be used as a
mode of entry in industries in which technological skills and production tech-
nology are key. The choice may also be inuenced by institutional, cultural
and transaction cost factors, in particular, the attitude towards takeovers,
conditions in capital markets, liberalization policies, privatization, regional
integration, currency risks and the role played by intermediaries (e.g. invest-
ment bankers) actively seeking acquisition opportunities and taking initia-
tives in making deals."
As for the modes of nance, there is a distinction between equity capital,
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intra-company loans and reinvestment of retained earnings. Figure 1.2 [which
reproduces Figure 1.4 of U.N. (2005)] describes the relative share of these
three modes of nance over the last decade. The lions share of FDI is
nanced through equity capital, 60%-70%. The share of intra-rm loans
has risen in the 1990s but has declined sharply in the 2000s. This decline
is due mainly to repatriation of such loans by multinationals in developed
economies. The third mode of nance, reinvestment of retained earnings,
seems to exhibit a mirror image pattern to the intra-rms loans.
(Figure 1.2 about here)
The macro-nance literature on FDI started with studies examining the
e¤ects of exchange rates on FDI. These studies focused on the positive ef-
fects of an exchange rate depreciation in the host country on FDI inows. A
real exchange rate depreciation lowers the cost of production and investment
in the host country, thereby raising the protability of foreign direct invest-
ment7. The wealth e¤ect is another channel through which a depreciation
of the real exchange rate could raise FDI. By raising the relative wealth of
foreign rms, a depreciation of the real exchange rate could make it easier
for these rms to use the retained earnings to nance investment abroad, or
to post a collateral in borrowing from domestic lenders in the host country
capital market; see, for instance, Froot and Stein (1991).
Later macroeconomic studies emphasize the e¤ect of FDI on long-run eco-
nomic growth and cyclical uctuations. A comprehensive study by Bosworth
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and Collins (1999) provides evidence on the e¤ect of capital inows on do-
mestic investment for 58 developing countries during 1978-95.8 The sample
covers nearly all of Latin America and Asia, as well as many countries in
Africa. They nd that an increase of a dollar in the volume of capital inows
is associated with an increase in domestic investment of about 50 cents. (In
the regression, both capital inows and domestic investment are expressed
as percentages of GDP). This result, however, masks signicant di¤erences
among di¤erent types of inows. FDI appears to bring about a one-for-one
increase in domestic investment; there is virtually no discernible relationship
between portfolio inows and investment (little or no impact); and the impact
of loans falls between those of the other two. These results hold both for the
58-country sample and for a subset of 18 emerging markets. Boresztein, De
Gregorio, and Lee (1998) nd that FDI increases economic growth when the
level of education in the host country - a measure of its absorptive capacity -
is high.9 Similarly, Razin (2004) nds strong evidence for the dominant posi-
tive e¤ect of FDI (relative to other forms of foreign investments) on domestic
investment and growth.
The macroeconomic-nance literature also notes that foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) has proved to be resilient during nancial crises. For in-
stance, in East Asian countries, such investment was remarkably stable dur-
ing the global nancial crises of 1997-98. In sharp contrast, other forms
of private capital ows - portfolio equity and debt ows, and particularly
short-term ows - were subject to large reversals during the same period; see
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Dadush, Dasgupta, and Ratha (2000), Lipsey (2001), Loungani and Razin
(2001), and Razin and Sadka (2003). The resilience of FDI during nancial
crisis was also evident during the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the Latin
American debt crisis of the 1980s.10
1.4 Scope and Purpose
Foreign direct investment is a form of international capital ows. It may play
an important role in the general allocation of world capital across countries.
It is often pictured, together with other forms of capital ows, as shifting cap-
ital from rich, capital-abundant economies to poor, capital-scarce economies,
so as to close the gap between the rates of return to capital, and enhance
the e¢ ciency of the world-wide stock of capital. This is the neo-classical
paradigm. This general portrayal of international capital ows may indeed
pertain to FDI ows from developed countries to developing countries. The
latter are almost all net recipients of FDI. Even in this case, multinational
FDI investors bring not only scarce capital to the host developing countries
but also superior technologies and new industries.
However, the neo-classical portrayal of international capital ow is hardly
reminiscent of the FDI ows among developed countries, which are much
larger that those from developed to developing countries. Although net ag-
gregate FDI ows from, or to, a developed country is typically small, the
gross ows are quite large (see Table 1.1). As Lipsey (2000) observes: "The
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ows among the developed countries mainly seem to reshu­ e the ownership
of productive assets, moving them to owners who want them more than their
current owners and who are willing to pay the most for them. Presumably,
capital ows move assets from less e¢ cient to more e¢ cient owners, or from
owners who are technologically or commercially backward in their industries
to rms that are technological leaders. In none of these cases do such ows
necessarily change the location of the production, assets, or employment of
these industries, though."
In view of this succinct account of FDI ows among developed countries,
there arises a question whether FDI plays any useful economic role except
the mere shift of asset ownership. Similarly, in many cases FDI to developing
countries is also merely a roundtripping of capital. Savers in a developing
country which does not have developed and well-functioning saving and -
nancial intermediation institutions export their capital to a location which
specializes in exporting back FDI to this country (China and Hong Kong are
a notable example). In this case too there arises the same question of whether
this roundtripping of capital, which created no net import of capital, serves
any useful economic role.
The theme advanced in this book views things in a sharply di¤erent way.
We develop an empirically oriented theory which attributes a meaningful
economic consequences and implications to a two-way ows of FDI among
developed countries. Also, our book assigns a clearly unique role to FDI,
as distinct from FPI and other forms of international capital ows. A key
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hypothesis of this book is that FDI rms are more e¢ ciently managed than
other rms. Thus, for instance, Perez-Gonzalez (2005) shows that after a
foreign investor establishes a position that is greater than 50% of the rms
shares, the rms productivity improves signicantly. Having an empirically
oriented theory enables us to confront its implications with the data.
1.4.1 Bilateral FDI Flows
FDI ows between a pair of countries. Therefore, there may be important
country-pair characteristics that drives the ows of FDI between these two
countries. For instance, a common language, the geographical distance, the
similarity or di¤erence in the legal systems (especially, corporate governance
and accounting standards), bilateral trade or monetary agreements, common
security arrangements, etc. are all factors that can facilitate or undermine the
bilateral ows of FDI. This book studies the determinants of the aggregate
ows of FDI between pairs of countries rather than the aggregate ows into
a specic country from the rest of the world. Indeed, there are recently rich
dataset on bilateral FDI ows, especially on ows that originate from OECD
source counties. Needless to say, studies of bilateral FDI ows help us to
better understand the aggregate ows in and out of a country.
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1.4.2 Roadmap
We start by studying the features that divide foreign investment between
FDI and portfolio ows. FDI stands out, relative to other ows, in that FDI
investors assume control and management. Therefore, FDI rms are more
e¢ ciently managed. This is a key hypothesis in the analysis in this book.
There are, however, also costs to direct investments. We specify two types
of costs. The rst type reects the initial xed cost that an FDI investor
has to incur in order to manage the rm. The second type, endogenously
determined, reects the cost that may be inicted on a direct investor when
she must sell the rm because of some liquidity shock. Because this idio-
syncratic shock is unobserved, the market may not be able to distinguish
whether the sale is caused by this shock or rather by some negative signal,
private to the FDI investor, about the rms prots; and therefore the sale
price is decreased. Thus, foreign investors with a low probability of liquidity
shocks (for instance, high-pocket multinationals) select to be foreign direct
investors, whereas the other choose portfolio investments.
Having analyzed the formation of foreign direct investors, relative to port-
folio investments, we turn to analyze aspects of foreign direct investors in re-
lation to domestic investors. We study a screening mechanism through which
foreign direct investors manifest their comparative advantage over domestics
investors in eliciting high-productivity rms. We show that this advantage
diminishes as corporate transparency is improved; and the ows of FDI fall
accordingly.
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The existence of xed setup cost of new investments introduces two mar-
gins of FDI decisions. There is an intensive margin of determining the mag-
nitude of the ows of FDI, according to standard marginal productivity con-
ditions, and also an extensive margin of determining whether at all to make a
new investment. Country-pair specic shocks may a¤ect these two margins
in di¤erent ways. Maintaining wages xed in the host country, a positive
productivity shock in this country increases the marginal products of the
factors of production (including capital), and has therefore a positive e¤ects
on the ows of FDI that are governed by the intensive margin. However,
when wages are allowed to adjust, the productivity shock generates an up-
ward pressure on wages which raises the xed setup costs and discourage
FDI through the extensive margin. We formulate these conicting e¤ects of
productivity shock in the host country in a way that allows an econometric
application. We also analyze productivity shocks in the source country which
may have di¤erent e¤ects on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) FDI, and on
greeneld FDI.
Datasets on bilateral FDI ows typically include many source-host coun-
try observations with zero ows. This, by itself, is somewhat indicative of
the existence of an extensive margin with the country-pair heterogeneity of
xed setup costs. In Part Two we explain and illustrate the advantage of em-
ploying the Heckman selection bias method (over Tobit and other methods)
in empirically studying the determinants of bilateral FDI ows. This is done
in a sample of panel data on 24 OECD countries over the period from 1981
14 CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
to 1998. The data are drawn from the source OECD dataset which reports
FDI ows from OECD countries to both OECD and non-OECD countries,
as well as FDI ows from non-OECD countries to OECD countries But it
does not report FDI ows from non-OECD countries to non-OECD coun-
tries. We therefore chose to employ for much of the analysis a panel data on
24 OECD countries over the period 1981 to 1998, for which data on ows in
all directions are available.
Part Three analyzes the main empirical studies of the country-pair de-
terminants of FDI. The e¤ects of productivity shocks are investigated in a
sample of panel data on 62 countries (29 OECD countries and 33 non-OECD
countries) over the period from 1987 to 2000. As there is a large heterogeneity
in the productivity shocks between OECD and non-OECD countries, which
is useful for analyzing the e¤ects of productivity on FDI ows, we chose to
study a larger sample of panel data in this case. We nd some evidence in
support of the conicting e¤ects of productivity shocks.
We also investigate the role played by the host and source corporate tax
rates on the intensive and extensive margins. We nd that the host country
tax rate has a negative e¤ect primarily on the intensive margin, whereas the
source tax rate has a positive e¤ect mostly on the extensive margin.
Finally, we discuss some policy implications. Specically, we formulate an
international tax competition model to explain the co-existence of a "rich"
source country with high capital-income (business and individuals) taxes and
public expenditures and a "poor" host country with low capital-income taxes
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and public expenditures. This phenomenon may be common in the enlarged
EU with the new accession countries which, are predominant recipients of
FDI from the old member countries. We also analyze the welfare gains from
a tax coordination.
16 NOTES
Notes
1See also Feenstra (1999).
2Other forms of foreign investment, such as debt, also increased dramat-
ically, especially to non-OECD countries.
3Among non-OECD countries, China with $72 billion is by far the largest
recipient of FDI in 2005, surpassed only by the U.K. and the U.S.
4For instance, BG and BP of the U.K., Total of France and Repsol of
Spain were all expropriated in Bolivia in 2006. A similar fate hit Petrobras
in Brazil and Occidental-Petroleum in Ecuador.
5For a comprehensive treatise of the role of multinational in International
trade see Markusen (2002).
6See, for instance, Yeaple (2003) for an empirical investigation of the scope
of vertical FDI.
7See, for instance, Blonigen (1997).
8Note that foreign investment per se is not related one-to-one to domes-
tic investment. As noted by Froot (1991) for the case of FDI, it actually
requires neither capital ows nor investment in capacity. Conceptually, FDI
is an extension of corporate control over international boundaries: "When
Japanese-owned Bridgestone takes control over the US rm Firestone, cap-
ital need not ow into the US. US domestic lenders can largely nance the
equity purchase. Any borrowing by Bridgestone from foreign-based third
parties also does not qualify as FDI (although it would count as an inow
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of portfolio capital into US). And, of course, in such acquisition there is
no investment expenditure; merely an international transfer in the title of
corporate assets."
9Alfaro et al (2004) nd that education level, development of local nan-
cial markets, and other local conditions play an important role in allowing
the positive e¤ect of FDI to materialize.
10Furthermore, the ow of FDI may even intensify during nancial crises.
Krugman (2000) argues that in nancial crises foreigners can take advantage
of re sales of assets by liquidity-constrained domestic investors.
18 NOTES
Part I
A Theory of FDI with
Threshold Barriers
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Chapter 2
Foreign Direct Investment and
Foreign Portfolio Investment
2.1 Introduction
International equity ows take two major forms: Foreign Direct Investments
(FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI). Despite the empirical interest
in foreign equity ows, very little work has been done on jointly explaining
FDI and FPI in a rigorous analytical framework. In this chapter, we propose
such a framework, and provide a model of a trade o¤ between FDI and FPI,
which is consistent with the empirical regularity that FDI ows are generally
less volatile than FPI ows. For instance, Table 5 in Lipsey (2000) shows
that the ratio of standard deviations to means are 1.008 for FDI ows to
Europe and 2.102 for FPI ows to Europe in the years 1969-1993.
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Our model highlights a key di¤erence between the two types of invest-
ment: FDI investors, who exert a higher degree of control and supervision
over the management in the domestic rms; and FPI investors, who exert
much less control over domestic rms, and delegate decisions to managers,
but limit their freedom to make decisions because the managers agenda
may not be always consistent, with that of the owners. Consequently, due
to agency problem between managers and owners and "free rider" problem
among the rmowners, portfolio investment projects are managed less e¢ -
ciently than direct investment projects. As noted succinctly by Oliver Hart
(2001), "If the shareholder does something to improve the quality of man-
agement, then the benets will be enjoyed by all shareholders. Unless the
shareholder is altruistic, she will ignore this benecial impact on other share-
holders and so will under-invest in the activity of monitoring or improving
management." To be more specic, direct investors, who act e¤ectively as
managers of their own projects, are more willing to acquire costly information
regarding changes in the prospects of their projects than portfolio investors.
FDI investors are also more willing to exert costly monitoring on their man-
agers than portfolio investors. Thus, FDI investors manage their projects
more e¢ ciently. This e¤ects generates an advantage, with an added value in
the capital markets, to direct investment relative to portfolio investments.
As we pointed out above, there are, however, costs to direct investments.
We specify two types of costs. The rst type, exogenously given in the model,
reects the initial xed cost that an FDI investor has to incur in order to build
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and train managerial teams, supervisory boards, etc. which are required to
achieve e¢ cient functioning of the domestic project.1
The second type of costs, an information-based cost, is derived endoge-
nously in the model. It results from the possibility that investors need to
sell their investments before maturity because they face liquidity shocks. In
such circumstances, the price they can get will be lower if they have more
information on the economic fundamentals of the investment project. This
is because when potential buyers know that the seller has more information,
they may suspect that the sale results from bad information on the prospects
of the investment (rather than from a negative liquidity shocks), and will thus
be willing to pay only a lower price. Hence, if they invest directly, the in-
vestors bear the cost of getting a lower price if and when they are forced to
sell the project before maturity. As the Economist (May 1, 2003) succinctly
puts it: "FDI is a lot more di¢ cult to withdraw when times are hard. In-
vestments may have to be sold at a loss, if they can be sold at all." This
may create a bias of less illiquidity-prone investors, such as "deep-pocket"
multinationals, in favor of FDI.2 More illiquidity-prone investors, such as in-
stitutional investors who are subject to frequent withdrawals, are biased in
favor of FPI.3
Our model, therefore, describes a key trade o¤ between management ef-
ciency and liquidity. Both sides of this trade o¤ are driven by the e¤ect
of asymmetric information, which comes with control. When they invest
directly, investors get more information about the fundamentals of the in-
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vestment, and thereby can manage the project more e¢ ciently, than their
portfolio-investors counterparts. However, this also generates a "lemons"
type problem when they try to sell the investment before maturity (Akerlof
(1970)). Therefore, this superior information e¤ect reduces the price they
can get when they are forced to sell the project prematurely.
This trade o¤between e¢ ciency and liquidity has strong roots in existing
empirical evidence. The idea that control increases e¢ ciency and the value of
the rm, which constitutes one side of the trade o¤, is supported empirically
by two recent papers in the international nance literature. The rst paper
- by Perez-Gonzalez (2005) - shows that after a foreign investor establishes a
position that is greater than 50% of the rms shares, the rms productivity,
computed using data on future earnings, improves. The second paper - by
Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2005) - demonstrates the positive response in the
stock market to the establishment of control (dened, again, as more than
50% ownership). Because having more than 50% ownership is the ultimate
indication for control, these two papers provide clear evidence on the link
between control and value, which is a basic premise of this book. It should be
noted, however, that large shareholders can achieve a¤ective control in many
cases by holding a block that is much smaller than 50% of the rm. This
has been noted in the nance literature by Sheifer and Vishny (1986), Bolton
and von Thadden (1998), and others. Going back to our basic premise, this
implies that the value of the rm may increase with ownership concentration
even when the controlling shareholder has a block that is smaller than 50%.
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Such evidence is provided by Wruck (1989) and by Hertzel and Smith (1993).
This is much in line with our focus on the trade o¤ between FDI and FPI,
as many FDI investments exhibit blocks that are much smaller than 50%.
The other side of the trade o¤ - the idea that the sale of shares by control
holders generates a larger price impact than a sale by other investors - can be
supported by two strands in the nancial literature. First, it has been shown
that the sale of stocks by large block holders has a bigger downward e¤ect on
the price than sales of stocks by other investors; for example, see Mikkelson
and Partch (1985), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1990), and Chan and
Lakonishok (1995). Following the logic above, this result may well apply to
the basic premise in this chapter, as large block holders probably have more
control over the rmsmanagement. Second, perhaps the best evidence on
the price impact of sale in the presence of control can be obtained by looking
at what happens when the rm sells its own shares. After all, the rm
has ultimate control over its operations, and thus this type of transaction
is expected to su¤er most from asymmetric information between the seller
(rm) and potential buyers. Indeed, the nance literature has documented
the large decrease in price following an announcement by the rm that it is
going to sell mew equity (a seasoned equity o¤ering, SEO); for example, see
Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Korajczyk, Lucas, and MacDonald (1991).
A main implication of the trade o¤ between e¢ ciency and liquidity de-
scribed in this chapter is that investors with high (low) expected liquidity
needs are more likely to choose less (more) control. This is because investors
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with high expected liquidity needs are a¤ected more by the low sale price
associated with control, whereas those with low expected liquidity needs are
a¤ected more by the e¢ ciency in management. As a result, in equilibrium,
assets under control are less likely to be liquidated prematurely. This is
consistent with evidence provided, for example, by Hennart, Kim, and Zeng
(1998) in the management literature. This show that international investors
are much more likely to exit from joint ventures than from fully owned in-
vestments, which clearly exhibit more control. In the context of our chapter,
since FDI exhibit more control than FPI, the former is expected to be liqui-
dated less often.4
This chapter has some roots in the existing literature. Albuquerque
(2003) develops a model aimed at explaining the di¤erences between the
volatility of direct investments and the volatility of portfolio investments.
His work relies on expropriation risks and the inalienability of direct invest-
ments, and thus is di¤erent from the information-based mechanism developed
here.
Other works in the literature use the asymmetric information hypothesis
to address di¤erent issues related to FDI. In Froot and Stein (1991), Klein
and Rosengren (1994), and Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002), the hypothesis
is that FDI is information intensive, and thus FDI investors, who know more
about their investments that outsiders, face a problem in raising resources
for their investments. Gordon and Bovenbrg (1996) assume asymmetric in-
formation between domestic investors and foreign investors to explain the
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home bias phenomenon. Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) explain the pecking
order of international capital ows with a model of asymmetric information.
Finally, Razin and Sadka (2003) analyze the gains from FDI when foreign
direct investors have superior information on the fundamentals of their in-
vestment, relative to foreign direct portfolio investors. Importantly, none of
these papers analyzes the e¤ects of asymmetric information on the liquidity
of FDI and FPI, which is a major factor in the trade o¤ developed in this
chapter.5
2.2 The Model
A small economy is faced by a continuum [0,1] of foreign investors. Each
investor has an opportunity to invest in one investment project. Investment
can occur in two forms. The rst form is a direct investment. The second
form is a portfolio investment. The di¤erence between the two forms of
investment, in our model, is that a direct investor will e¤ectively act like a
manager, whereas in case of a portfolio investment, the investor will not be
the manager, and the project will be managed by an "outsider". We assume
that investors are risk neutral, and thus each investor chooses the form of
investment that maximizes her ex-ante expected payo¤.
There are three periods of time: 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, each investor
decides whether to make a direct investment or a portfolio investment. In
period 2, the project matures. The net cash ow from the project is denoted
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by R(K; "), where " is a random productivity factor that is independently
realized for each project in period 1, and K is the level of capital input
invested in the project in period 1, after the realization of ". For tractability
we assume that R(K; ") takes the special form:
R(K; ") = (1 + ")K   1
2
BK2: (2.1)
We assume that " is distributed between -1 and 1, according to a cu-
mulative distribution function G(), and a density function g() = G0(). we
also assume that E(") = 0: The parameter B, that a¤ects negatively the
net cash ow from a project, may reect higher production costs, and/or
lower productivity. For brevity we simply refer to it as a production cost
parameter.
2.2.1 Management and E¢ ciency
In period 1, after the realization of the productivity shock, the manager of
the project observes ". Thus, if the investor owns the project as a direct
investment, she observes ", and chooses K, so as to maximize the net cash
ow. The chosen level of K is denoted by K("), and is given by:
K(") =
1 + "
B
: (2.2)
Thus, the ex-ante expected net cash ow from a direct investment, if it
is held until maturity, is given by:
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E
 
(1 + ")  (1 + ")
B
  1
2
B

1 + "
B
2!
=
E
 
(1 + ")2

2B
: (2.3)
In case of a portfolio investment, the owner is not the manager, and thus
she does not observe ". In this case, the manager follows earlier instructions
as for the level of K. A possible rationale behind this sequence of rm
decisions, whereby the level of capital input K is determined ex ante, has
to do with a potential agency problem between the owner and the manager
(who is responsible for making these decisions). Loosely speaking, the latter
is not exclusively interested in the net worth of the rm as in the former.
For example, with no explicit instructions at hand, the manager may wish
to set K at the highest possible level in order to gain power and nancial
rewards. As a result, when the owner does not have information about the
rms productivity, she will have to set investment guidelines for the manager
(who knows more about " than she does) so as to protect her own interests.6
The ex-ante instruction is chosen by the owner so as to maximize the
expected return absent any information on the realization of ", and is based
on the ex ante zero mean. Thus, the manager will be instructed to choose
K = K(0) = 1
B
. Then, the ex-ante expected payo¤ from a portfolio invest-
ment, if it is held until maturity, is:
E

(1 + ")
B
  1
2B

=
E (1 + 2")
2B
=
1
2B
: (2.4)
It follows from Jensens inequity7 that E

(1 + ")2

> [E (1 + ")]2 = 1.
30CHAPTER 2. FOREIGNDIRECT INVESTMENTANDFOREIGNPORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Therefore, comparing equation (2.3) with equation (2.4), we see that if the
project is held until maturity, it yields a higher payo¤ as a direct investment
than as a portfolio investment. This result reects e¢ ciency that results
from a hands-on management style in the case of a direct investment.
There are, however, costs to direct investments. We specify two types of
costs. The rst type, reects the xed initial cost that an FDI investor has
to incur in order to acquire the expertise to manage the project directly. We
denote this cost, which is exogenously given in the model, by C. We simply
assume that an investor who chooses FDI over FPI has to pay the xed cost
at time 0. We refer to this cost as an FDI cost.
The second type, an information-based cost, is derived endogenously in
the model. It results from the possibility of liquidity shocks occurring in
period 1.
2.2.2 Liquidity Shocks and Resale Prices
In period 1, before the value of " is observed, the owner of the project might
get a liquidity shock. With the realization of a liquidity shock, the investor
is forced to sell the project immediately, that is, in period 1.8
We denote by  the probability of liquidity shocks. We assume that there
are two types of foreign investors. A proportion of one-half of the investors
has high expected liquidity needs, and the remaining proportion has low
expected liquidity needs. Formally, we assume that the rst type of investors
("investors of type "H") face a liquidity need with probability H , whereas
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the second type (type "L") face a liquidity need with probability L. For
simplicity, we assume that 1 > H > 12 > L > 0, and that H + L = 1.
9
Investors know their type ex ante, but this is their own private information.
There is, however, also a possibility that an investor will liquidate a
project in period 1 even if there is no liquidity shock. This can happen
if and only if the initial investor observes a relatively low realization of ". In
such a case she does have superior information over the potential buyer, and
can exploit it. Because portfolio investors do not observe " in period 1, only
direct investors sell their investment project at that time when a liquidity
shock is absent. Because all kinds of sales occur simultaneously in period
1, buyers do not know the reason for a sale of any individual project. They
know, however, whether the investment project is sold by a direct investor
or by a portfolio investor. Because only direct investment projects are sold
due to low productivity shocks, the price that direct investors can get when
they try to sell the project in period 1 will be lower than the price obtained
by portfolio investors. This generates a cost of the second type to FDI.
To evaluate this cost, we now derive the price that a direct investor gets
if she sells the project in period 1. The pice is equal to the expected value of
the project from the point of view of the potential buyer, given that the buyer
knows that the owner is trying to sell, and given that she does not know the
reason for the sale. We denote the maximum level of ", under which the
direct investor is selling the project in absence of a liquidity shock, by "D:
Also, we denote by D the probability, as perceived by the market, that an
32CHAPTER 2. FOREIGNDIRECT INVESTMENTANDFOREIGNPORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
FDI investor gets a liquidity shock. Both "D and D will be endogenously
determined in equilibrium. Given that the FDI owner sells her projects, the
buyer thinks that with probability (1   D)G("D) the owner is selling the
project due to a low realization of ", and with probability D that she sells
the projects because of a liquidity shock.
If the project is sold due to a liquidity shock, that is, before the initial
owner observes " (recall that liquidity shocks are realized before productivity
shocks), the value of " is not recorded in the rms before the sale. Therefore,
the buyer does not know the value of ". However, if the project is sold for
low-protability reasons, the owner will know the value of " after the sale.10
Using Bayesrule, the period 1 price that the direct investor gets for the
project is given by:
P1;D =
(1  D)
R "D
 1
(1+")2
2A
g(")d"+ D
R 1
 1
1+2"
2A
g(")d"
(1  D)G("D) + D
: (2.5)
The initial owner, in turn, sets the threshold level "D, such that given
P1;D, when observing "D, she is indi¤erent between selling, or not selling, the
project. This yields the following equation:
P1;P =
(1 + "D)
2
2B
: (2.6)
Thus, equations (2.5) and (2.6) simultaneously determine P1;D and "D
as functions of the market-perceived probability D, denoted by "D(D) and
P1;D(D); respectively.
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Note that "D(D) and P1;D(D) are increasing in D: when D is high, the
buyer thinks that the probability that an early sale results from a liquidity
shock (and not from a bad realization of the productivity parameter) is also
high. Consequently, the resale price of the project in period 1 is high as
well. This means that FDI investors sell their projects more often (that is,
under a higher threshold "D). An implication is that investors have a greater
incentive to choose FDI in period 0 when the market participants think that
investors with high liquidity needs choose FDI. This externality plays an
important role in the next section where we derive the equilibrium allocation
and market prices.
Note also that "D is always below 0, and consequently P1;D is always
below 1
2B
. This feature plays an important role in the comparison between
the resale price of FDI and the resale price of portfolio investments. To
conduct this comparison, let us characterize the resale price of a portfolio
investment project. Essentially, when a portfolio investor sells the projects
in period 1, everybody knows she does it because of a liquidity shock. Thus,
the price she gets for the project is given by:
P1;P =
Z 1
 1
1 + 2"
2B
g(")d" =
1
2B
: (2.7)
Now, we can see that the resale price of a direct investment in period 1
is always lower than the resale price of a portfolio investment in that period.
The intuition is that if a direct investor prematurely sells the investment
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project, the market price must reect the possibility that the sale originates
from inside information on low prospects of this investment project.
We can now summarize the essential trade-o¤ between FDI and FPI.
A benet of a direct investment is that it enables the investor to manage
the project more e¢ ciently. This increases the return that she gets in case
she does not have to sell the project prematurely. However, if a foreign in-
vestor ex-ante chooses to hold the project as a direct investment, but sells
the project prematurely, she gets a relatively low price. This is because po-
tential buyers perceive that with some probability the project is sold due to
negative inside information about the prospects of the investment. Thus, the
additional information associated with a direct investment is not necessarily
benecial. In addition, investing directly entails a xed cost C. With such
trade o¤ between FDI and FPI in mind, investors choose the type of invest-
ment that maximizes their ex ante expected net cash ow. We now turn to
study this choice.
2.3 Ex-Ante Choice between FDI and FPI
2.3.1 Expected Value of FDI
With probability i (i = H;L), an investor of type i gets a liquidity shock,
and sells the project in period 1. (Note that this probability can be di¤erent
from D, the probability perceived by the market.) The market price is:
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P1;D(D) =
(1 + "D (D))
2
2B
:
With probability 1  i, the investor does not get a liquidity shock. She
sells the project if the realization of " is below "D (D), but she does not sell
it if the realization of " is above "D (D) : Recall that "D (D) is determined
by equations (2.5) and (2.6). Therefore, the expected payo¤, in the state of
no liquidity shock is
Z "D(D)
 1
(1 + "D (D))
2
2B
g(")d"+
Z 1
"D(D)
(1 + ")2
2B
g(")d":
In addition, a direct investor has to incur a xed cost of C: Thus, the
ex-ante expected net cash ow for a direct investor, as a function of i, and
A, is given by:
EVDirect (i; D; B) = (1  i)
hR "D(D)
 1
(1+"D(D))
2
2B
g(")d"+
R 1
"D(D)
(1+")2
2B
g(")d"
i
+i
(1+"D(D))
2
2B
  C:
(2.8)
2.3.2 Expected Value of FPI
When the investor holds the investment as a portfolio investment, with prob-
ability i, she receives a liquidity shock, and sells the project in period 1.
Then, the selling price is:
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P1;P =
1
2B
:
With probability 1   i, the investor does nor receive a liquidity shock.
Then, her expected net cash ow is:
E (1 + 2")
2B
=
1
2B
:
Therefore, the ex ante expected net cash ow from a portfolio investment
is given by:
EVPortfolio(B) =
1
2B
: (2.9)
2.3.3 FDI and FPI
We denote the di¤erence between the expected value of FDI and the expected
value of FPI by:
Diff (i; D; B)  EVDirect (i; D; B)  EVPortfolio(B): (2.10)
Then, investor i will choose FDI when Diff (i; D; B) > 0; will choose FPI
when Diff (i; D; B) < 0; and will be indi¤erent between the two (that is,
may choose either FDI or FPI) when Diff (i; D; B) = 0:
The choice between FDI and FPI is governed by the parameters B and
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C. Investor i is more likely to choose FDI when:
(i) The FDI cost (C) is lower.
(ii) The productivity cost (B) is lower.
(iii) The probability of getting a liquidity shock (i) is lower.
(iv) The market-perceived probability D of a liquidity shock for FDI
investors is higher.
The result in Part (i) is expected: investors are less likely to choose FDI
when the xed cost they have to incur in order to set the direct investment
up is higher. Part (ii) says that when the production cost is higher, in-
vestors are less likely to choose FDI. The intuition behind this result is that
when the production cost increases, the overall protability of investment
projects decreases, and this makes it less benecial to incur the additional
xed cost associated with FDI. Part (iii) means that investors with lower
ex ante liquidity needs are more likely to choose direct investments. This is
because these investors expect to benet more from the long-term e¢ ciency
associates with FDI, and to su¤er less from the lower short-term price of this
form of investment. Finally, Part (iv) states that when the probability D
that is assessed by the market to a liquidity shock of FDI investors increases,
investors are more likely to choose FDI. The intuition is related to the fact
that the resale price of FDI increases in D. This makes direct investments
more attractive relative to portfolio investments.
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2.4 Market Equilibrium
2.4.1 The Allocation of Investors between FDI and
FPI
So far, we analyzed the (partial) equilibrium choice of the two types of in-
vestors between the two types of investments, given the market-perceived op-
erability D:To complete the description of equilibrium, it remains to specify
how D is determined. Assuming that rational expectations hold in the mar-
ket, D has to be consistent with the equilibrium choice of investors between
FDI and FPI. thus, it is given by the following equation:
D =
HH;FDI + LL;FDI
H;FDI + L;FDI
; (2.11)
where H;FDI is the proportion of H investors who choose FDI in equilibrium
and L;FDI is the proportion of L investors who choose FDI in equilibrium.11
Note that there cannot be an equilibrium where some H investors choose
FDI, while some L investors choose FPI. Thus, only ve cases can potentially
be observed in equilibrium. These are summarized as follows:
Case 1: All H and L investors choose FDI.
Case 2: All L investors choose FDI; H investors split between FDI and
FPI.
Case 3: All L investors choose FDI; H investors choose FPI.
Case 4: All L investors split between FDI and FPI; all H investors
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choose FPI.
Case 5: All H and L investors choose FPI.
In describing the equilibrium outcomes below, we will often refer to these
cases. It is worth noting that as we move from Case 1 to Case 5, the amount
of FDI in the economy decreases, while the amount of FPI increases. Note
also that only in cases 2, 3, and 4, FDI and FPI coexist in the economy. Also,
among these, Case 3 exhibits the largest di¤erence between expected liquidity
needs for a representative FDI investor and those for a representative FPI
investor.
Figure 2.1 provides a full characterization of the equilibrium allocation
of investors between FDI and FPI as a function of two parameters, H and
B. The value of H reects the probability that investors with high expected
liquidity needs will get a liquidity shock. Since we assumed that H+L = 1,
we know that the value of H also indirectly determines the value of L (which
reects the probability that investors with low expected liquidity needs will
get a liquidity shock). Thus, our interpretation is that an increase in H
reects an increase in the heterogeneity across investors. The derivation of
Figure 2.1 is relegated to the Appendix 2A.
(Figure 1.1 A&B about here)
Several features of Figure 2.1 are worth elaborating on. First, if FDI and
FPI coexist in equilibrium, then the expected liquidity needs of FDI investors
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are lower, on average, than the expected liquidity needs of FPI investors. As
noted above, the only possible cases in equilibrium, where FDI and FPI
coexist, are cases 2, 3, and 4. In all these cases, liquidity shocks are more
common among FPI investors than among FDI investors. Investors with high
expected liquidity needs care less about the long-term e¢ ciency of FDI, and
care more about the short-term price. Thus, they have a higher tendency to
invest in FPI. On the other hand, investors with low expected liquidity needs
tend to prefer FDI. This result is consistent with the casual observation that
FDI investors are often large and stable multinational corporations with low
expected liquidity needs, whereas FPI investors (such as global mutual funds)
are, on average, more vulnerable to liquidity shocks. This result contributes
to the high withdrawal ratio of FPI relative to FDI, which can account for
the empirically-observed higher volatility of net FPI inows.
Second, as the production cost parameter (B) increases, there will be
more FPI and less FDI in equilibrium. As the level of B, which represents
the cost of production in the host country, increases, equilibrium outcomes
change from Case 1, via Cases 2 and 3, to Case 5 - that is, they gradually
exhibit more FPI and less FDI. Since B represents the cost of production,
we expect developed countries to have higher levels of B. Thus, our model
predicts that developed countries will attract more FPI, whereas developing
countries will attract more FDI. This is indeed consistent with empirical
evidence. Developed countries have higher costs of production, and thus
lower protability of investment projects. Thus, in these countries, it is
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less benecial to pay the xed costs associated with establishing an FDI
investment. Furthermore, when a foreign direct investor from a developed
country acquires a rm in a developing country, she may transfer her TFP in
the source country to the new rm, thereby reducing the productivity cost
B. This strengthens the relative attractivity of developing countries for FDI.
Third, as the liquidity need heterogeneity among investors increases, a
separating equilibrium - with a large di¤erence between the withdrawal rate
of FPI and the withdrawal rate of FDI - becomes more likely. When B < B,
an increase in H shifts the equilibrium outcome from Case 1, which is a
pooling equilibrium, to Case 3, which is a separating equilibrium with a
large di¤erence between the withdrawal rates of the two types of investment.
When B > B, an increase in H shifts the equilibrium outcome from Case
5, which is a pooling equilibrium, to Case 3. The implication is that a
high level of liquidity need heterogeneity among investors causes them to be
attracted to di¤erent types of investment, and leads to observed di¤erences
in withdrawal rates and volatility between FDI and FPI.
Fourth, there is a region of the fundamentals (B, H , C) with multiple
equilibria. Multiple equilibria exist when B < B and H(B) < H <
H (B): In this region, Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 are possible equilibria. The
reason for the multiplicity is the existence of externalities among H investors.
A H investor benets from having other investors of her type investing in
the same type of investment. This is because, then, when she tries to sell
the project, the price will not be that low since the market knows that the
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sale is very likely to be driven by a liquidity shock. As a result, when all H
investors invest in portfolio investments, an individual H investor would like
to do the same thing in order to avoid the low price of a direct investment in
case she needs to sell (given that he needs to sell quite often). Similarly, when
all H investors invest in direct investments, an individual H investor would
like to invest in a direct investment as well. This multiplicity may generate
jumps from an equilibrium with a lot of direct investments to an equilibrium
with much less direct investments. This may explain why some countries have
more direct investments than other countries with similar characteristics, and
why some periods of time are characterized by more direct investments than
others. The existence of multiple equilibria also generates interesting welfare
implications that will be discussed below.
2.4.2 The Probability of Early Withdrawals
Our analysis thus far showed that whenever the two types of investments
coexist in equilibrium, portfolio investors will be more likely than direct
investors to get a liquidity shock that forces them to sell their investments
in the short term. This, however, does not necessarily imply that FPIs are
being liquidated more often than FDIs in equilibrium. This is because, in
our model, FDIs are being liquidated, not only because of a liquidity shock,
but sometimes due to a low realization of ".
To see this formally, consider Case 3 as n equilibrium. This is the equilib-
rium where all H investors choose FPI and L investors choose FDI. Thus,
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it exhibits the largest di¤erence between the expected liquidity needs of FPI
investors and those of FDI investors. In this equilibrium, the probability of
an early withdrawal of FPI is H , whereas the probability of an early with-
drawal of FDI is L+(1 L)G ("D (L)) : Analyzing the di¤erence between
these two expressions, we can see that there are two opposite e¤ects. On
the one hand, since H > L, the probability of an early withdrawal that is
driven by a liquidity shock is greater for FPI than for FDI. But, on the other
hand, there is a probability of (1 L)G ("D (L)) that an FDI will be sold in
period 1 due to a low realization of ". This possibility does not exist with an
FPI. The condition, under which portfolio investments are being liquidated
more often in period 1 than direct investments, is then:
H > L + (1  L)G ("D (L)) : (2.12)
Since the left hand side of this condition increases in H and the right hand
side decreases in H (recall that H = 1   L), this condition implies that
portfolio investments will be liquidated more often in the short term as long
as H is high enough, or, in other words, as long as the heterogeneity among
investors is su¢ ciently strong.
2.4.3 Welfare Analysis
Our model has interesting welfare implications for the region of parameters
with multiple equilibria - that is, when B < B and H(B) < H < 

H (B):
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As a starting point, we analyze foreign investorswelfare in this region of
parameters, given the current framework. then, we use the result to study
the implications for the welfare of residents of the host country which is the
main focus of our welfare analysis.
When B < B and H(B) < H < 

H (B), our model has three equilibria:
Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3. Our analysis shows that when these three
equilibria are possible, Case 1 represents a Pareto improvement over the
other two equilibria. To see this, note that under Case 3, H investors choose
FPI and gain an expected payo¤ of 1
2B
. Similarly, under Case 2, they are
indi¤erent between FDI and FPI, and thus also gain an expected payo¤ of
1
2B
: Under Case 1, however, they choose FDI and gain an expected payo¤
of EVDirect(H ; 12 ; B). We know that this payo¤ is greater than
1
2B
, since
H investors chose to get it rather than to invest in FPI and get 12B . Thus,
H investors are better o¤ under Case 1, where they benet from the higher
e¢ ciency of FDI. When other equilibria occur in this range of parameters,
it is because of a coordination failure: H investors choose not to invest in
FDI because they believe other H investors will not invest in FDI, and thus
will reduce the expected value of this type of investment.
As for L investors, in all three equilibria they choose FDI. Under Case
3, their expected payo¤ is EVDirect(L; L; B); under Case 1, it is
EVDirect(H ;
1
2
; B); while under Case 2, it gets a value between
EVDirect(L; L; B) and EVDirect(H ; 12 ; B). Since EVDirect(i; D; B) is in-
creasing in D, we know that L investors are better o¤ in Case 1. The
2.4. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 45
reason is that under Case 1, all H investors choose direct investments, and
thus the price of direct investments in period 1 is higher.
With these results in mind, let us address the di¤erences in welfare from
the point of view of the residents of the host country. Up to this point,
the residents of the host country did not have an explicit role in our model.
A natural way to introduce them is to assume that they own the domestic
project initially, and sell them to foreign investors. Consider a representative
host country resident who owns one project in period 0 and behaves com-
petitively. At this time, she sells the projects to a foreign investor. After the
sales have taken place, the events in the model are exactly the same as we
described before: in period 0, foreign investors choose the form of investment,
and in period 1 they make a decision on whether to sell their investments or
not. Given this structure, the welfare analysis from the point of view of the
host-country representative resident boils down to analyzing the price that
she gets for her project in period 0.
In period 0, there are two types of foreign investors buying the investment
projects from the residents of the host country: H investors and L investors.
Since the type of each investor is not observable, in a competitive equilibrium,
the price of projects in period 0 will be determined by the lowest between
the value that is incurred to H investors and the value that is incurred to
L investors from holding the project. In our model, this is always the value
that is incurred to H investors. Thus, L investors capture some of the rent
due to their ability to maintain the project for a long time, and H investors
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do not capture any rent.
The price that host-country resident gets for the project in period 0 will
then be 1
2B
when either Case 2 or Case 3 is the realized equilibrium, and
EVDirect(H ;
1
2
; B) when Case 1 is the realized equilibrium. As we showed
above, in the region where all three equilibria are possible, the rst expression
is lower than the second one, meaning that the domestic resident gets higher
price when Case 1 is the realized equilibrium. This suggests that the host
country may benet from encouraging more investments to be in the form of
FDI.
2.5 Conclusion
The model we developed in this chapter describes an information-based trade
o¤between direct investments and portfolio investments. In the model, direct
investors are more informed about the fundamentals of their projects. This
information enables them to manage their projects more e¢ ciently. However,
it also creates an asymmetric-information problem in case they need to sell
their projects permanently, and reduces the price they can get in that case.
As a result, investors, who know they are more likely to get a liquidity shock
that forces them to sell early, are more likely to choose portfolio investments,
whereas investors, who know they are less likely to get a liquidity shock, are
more likely to choose direct investments.
The model generates several results that are consistent with empirical
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evidence. First, developed economies attract larger shares of FPI than de-
veloping economies. This may happen because the high labor costs in de-
veloped economies make the projects there less protable, and thus make it
less benecial to incur the xed costs associated with FDI. Moreover, the
high transparency in developed economies makes FPI there more e¢ cient.
Second, because investors with high expected liquidity needs are attracted
to FPI, while those with low expected liquidity needs are attracted to FDI,
our model can account for the high observed withdrawal rates of FPI rela-
tive to FDI, which also contribute to a high volatility of the former relative
to the latter. Third, developed economies with high levels of transparency
are expected to have smaller di¤erences between the withdrawal ratios of
FPI and those of FDI. This is because the high e¢ ciency of FPI in those
economies attracts more investors with low expected liquidity needs to FPI,
and prevents complete separation in equilibrium between investors with low
expected liquidity needs and those with high expected liquidity needs.
2A. Appendix
A key in the characterization of the equilibrium allocation of investors be-
tween FDI and FPI is the threshold value B, which is dened by the follow-
ing equation:
Diff(
1
2
;
1
2
; B) = 0: (2.A.1)
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Proposition: (i) for any B < B, there exist H(B) and 

H (B), where
1
2
< H(B) < 

H (B) < 1 and both 

H(B) and 

H (B) are strictly decreasing
in B . Then, when 1
2
< H < 

H(B), the only possible equilibrium is Case 1;
when H(B) < H < 

H (B), the possible equilibria are Case 1, Case 2, and
Case 3; and when H (B) < H < 1, the only possible equilibrium is Case 3.
(ii) For any B > B, there exists H (B), where
1
2
< H (B)  1 and
H (B) is strictly increasing in B. Then, when
1
2
< H < 

H (B), the only
possible equilibrium is Case 5; and when H (B) < H < 1, the only possible
equilibrium is Case 3.12
Proof:
We start by dening the condition for each case to be an equilibrium.
We base these conditions on: The equilibrium choice of agents between FDI
and FPI, as dened in Section 2.3; the equilibrium value of D, as dened in
Section 2.4 (including the o¤-equilibrium assumptions); and the properties
of the function D(i; D; B), which is dened by:
D(i; D; B) = (1 i)
R "D(D)
 1 (1 + "D(D))
2 g(")d"
+
R 1
"D(D)
(1 + ")2g(")d"

+i(1 + "D(D))2 2BC 1:
(2.A.2)
Then, the decision of investors between FDI and FPI depends on the sign
of D(i; D; B). An increase (decrease) in D(i; D; B) makes it more likely
that the investor will choose FDI (FPI). We now show that the signs of the
derivative of D(i; D; B) with respect to the di¤erent parameters support
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the four parts of the proposition.
(i)
@D(i; D; B)
@C
=  2B < 0:
(ii)
@D(i; D; B)
@B
=  2C < 0:
(iii)
@D(i;D;B)
@i
= (1 + "D(D))
2   R "D(D) 1 (1 + "D(D))2 g(")d"  R 1"D(D)(1 + ")2g(")d"
=
R 1
"D(D)

(1 + "D(D))
2   (1 + ")2 g(")d" < 0:
(iv)
@D(i; D; B)
@D
= 2
@"D(D)
@D
(1 + "D(D)) [(1  i)G ("D(D)) + i] > 0;
because @"D(D)
@D
> 0:
Case 1 is an equilibrium iff D(i; D; B)  0. Case 2 is an equilib-
rium iff D(i; D; B)  0 and D(H ; 12 ; B)  0: Case 3 is an equilibrium
iff D(H ; L; B)  0 and D(L; L; B)  0: Case 4 is an equilibrium iff
D(L; L; B) = 0. Case 5 is an equilibrium iff D(L; L; B)  0:
Now, we dene the thresholds H(B); 

H (B); and 

H (B) that are in-
cluded in the proposition. Threshold H(B) is dened by the equation
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D(H(B); 

L(B); B) = 0 (here, 

L(B)  1   H(B)): Threshold H (B)
is dened by: D(H (B);
1
2
; B) = 0: Finally, threshold H (B) is dened by:
D(L (B); 

L (B); B) = 0 (here, 

L (B)  1  H (B)):
Now, we characterize these thresholds as functions of B. The illustration
provided in Figure 2.2 can help in understanding this part of the proof. First,
note that H(B
) = H (B
) = H (B
) = 1
2
: (Recall that B is dened
in (2.A.1).) Then, by the properties of D(i; D; B), we know that both
H(B) and 

H (B) are decreasing in B, and that 

H (B) > 

H(B): Also, by
examining the function D(i; D; B) we can tell that 

H (B) < 1: Finally,
since D(; ;B) is decreasing in  (this is shown at the end of this proof)
and in B, H (B) is increasing in B.
Using the equilibrium conditions, we can now specify when each equilib-
rium will occur relative to the thresholds dened above. This specication
relies on the properties of the functionD(i; D; B), and on the property that
D(; ;B) is decreasing in , which will be shown below. Case 1 is an equilib-
rium iff H  H (B): Case 2 is an equilibrium iff H(B)  H  H (B):
Case 3 is an equilibrium iff H  H(B) and H  H (B): Case 4 is an
equilibrium iff H = 

H (B): Case 5 is an equilibrium iff H  H (B):
This leads to the characterization of equilibrium outcomes stated in the
proposition.
To complete the proof, we need to show that D(; ;B) is decreasing in
. We know that:
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D(; ;B) = (1 )
R "D()
 1 (1 + "D())
2 g(")d"
+
R 1
"D()
(1 + ")2g(")d"

+ (1 + "D())2 2BC 1:
Thus,
@D(; ;B)
@
=
R 1
"D()

(1 + "D())
2   (1 + ")2 g(")d"
+2
@"D()
@
(1 + "D()) [(1  )G("D()) + ] :
Plugging in the expression for @"D()
@
, as is implied by equations (2.5) and
(2.6), we get:
@D(; ;B)
@
=
R 1
"D()

(1 + "D())
2   (1 + ")2 g(")d"
+
 
1  (1 + "D())2

+
R "D()
 1

(1 + "D())
2   (1 + ")2 g(")d"
= 1  R 1 1(1 + ")2g(")d":
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Notes
1Note that in subsequent chapters this cost may consist of both host and
source country labor cost.
2Albuquerque (2003) provides another explanation as to why FDI may be
sold only at a loss. He argues that foreign direct investors typically transfer
some knowledge into the rm they acquire. This also makes it hard to with-
draw capital as the owner cannot guarantee that these intangible resources
will remain with the rm.
3See Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002) for evidence on the accessibility
of multinationals to bank credits.
4Regarding net foreign equity ows, the volatility of FDI is, in general,
much smaller than that of FPI.
Using World Bank data on 111 countries, Albuquerque (2003) shows
that 89% of the countries in his sample have lower coe¢ cient of variation
of net FDI inows than that of other net inows. A related set of evidence
suggests that FDI has proven to be much more resilient during nancial
crises, and thus contributes to the stability of the host country; see Chuhan,
Perez-Quiros and Popper (1996), Frankel and Rose (1996), Lipsey (2001),
and Sarno and Taylor (1999). Moreover, empirical analysis has established
that the di¤erences in volatility between FPI and FDI ows are much smaller
for developed economies than for developing economies.
Lipsey (2000) shows that the ratio of FDIs volatility to other long-term
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owsvolatility is 0.59 in Latin America, 0.74 in South East Asia, 0.86 in
Europe, and 0.88 in the US. Thus, the di¤erences in volatility between net
FDI inows and other types of net inows are smaller in developed economies.
5Although we write this chapter in the context of international capital
ows, we believe the mechanism we suggest here is more general, and can
serve to analyze the trade o¤between direct investments and portfolio invest-
ments, or between management e¢ ciency and liquidity, in other contexts. In
a related paper, Bolton and von-Thadden (1998) analyze a trade o¤ between
direct investments and portfolio investments. This model, however, is not
based on the di¤erences in information that each one of these investments
provides. Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug (1998) study models where
the information held by institutional investors does not always improve the
value of the rm, as institutional investors might use this information to
make trading prots instead of to improve rm performance. These models
do not look, however, at the decision of the investors on whether to acquire
information when they might get liquidity shocks. This chapter also touches
on other issues that have been discussed in the nance literature. Admati
and Peiderer (1991) discuss the incentive of traders to reveal the fact that
they are trading for liquidity reasons and not because of bad information.
Admati and Peiderer (1998) and Foster and Viswanathan (990) point to
the existence of externalities among traders who trade for liquidity reasons.
6The argument, according to which the manager wishes to make larger
investments and build an empire is common in the corporate nance liter-
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ature (see Jensen (1986)). In such a case, if the owner cannot verify the
information that the manger had at the time of the decision, she will not be
able to prove that the manager acted to maximize his own objective function.
As a result, a contract that instructs the manger to maximize the value of
the rm given his information will not be enforceable.
The agency problem is not modelled explicitly here because we want to
focus instead on its implications for the trade o¤ between direct investments
and portfolio investments. What we do, however, capture in our model is
the spirit of the agency problem, and the ine¢ ciency associated with the fact
that the owner of the project is not the manager.
7Jensens inequity states that F [E(~x)] < E [F (~x)], if F is strictly convex
and ~x is a non-degenerate random variable.
8This feature of the model is similar to the preference-shock assumption
made by Diamond and Dybvig (1983): an investor who is subject to a liquid-
ity shock derives her utility only from period-1 consumption. If, however, she
is subject to a liquidity shock, she derives her utility from period-2 consump-
tion. As a result, an investor who is subject to a liquidity shock is forced to
sell the project in period 1, because she cannot a¤ord to wait and collect the
payo¤ from the project in period 2.
9Note that our results hold in a more general setting, that is, for any
H > L:The assumption that H+L = 1 allows us to change the di¤erence
between H and L by changing only one of these two parameters.
10Note that this is just a technical assumption regarding the procedures of
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the sales. It does not qualitatively a¤ect the results.
11It should be noted that if all investors choose FPI in equilibrium, D
cannot be dened by the above equation. This is because in such an equilib-
rium, investors are not expected to choose FDI at all. Thus, we need to make
an o¤-equilibrium assumptions to determine D in case that an investor di-
verges from that equilibrium and chooses to hold a direct investment. Since
L investors have greater incentives to hold direct investments than H in-
vestors, we assume that, in an equilibrium where all investors choose FPI,
if an investor diverges and invests in FDI, the market assesses a probability
of L to the event that this investor had a liquidity shock. Note that this
o¤-equilibrium assumption is not important for our results.
12For brevity, we do not characterize here the equilibrium outcomes for the
specic values: B = B; H = 

H ; H = 

H ; H = 

H :
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Chapter 3
Foreign versus Domestic Direct
Investment: Cream-Skimming
3.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we attempted to explain the allocation of foreign
investors between FDI and FPI. We highlighted a key di¤erence between the
two types of investments. In the case of FDI, both ownership and control
of a rm is acquired, whereas in the case of FPI control is not achieved.
The acquisition of control entails FDI investors an e¢ ciency gain, but at a
xed cost of becoming an FDI investors and a variable information-based
cost associated with liquidity needs. A balance between the benet and cost
of FDI generates an equilibrium assignment of investors to foreign direct
investments and foreign portfolio investments, depending on some liquidity
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need characteristics of the investors.
The focus of this book is FDI. Having analyzed the endogenous formation
of this type of investments, relative to portfolio investments, we turn from
now on to analyze other key aspects of foreign direct investors in relation to
domestic investors. In doing so, we abstract from the liquidity aspect and
take the formation of investor types to be exogenous.
In this chapter we analyze a screening mechanism through which foreign
direct investors manifest their comparative advantage over domestic investors
in gaining control over domestic rms.
We develop a simple model in which the industry specialization in the
source country provides a comparative advantage to potential foreign di-
rect investors in eliciting good investment opportunities in the host coun-
try, relative to domestic investors. The advantage stems from the ability
of FDI investors to apply better industry-specic, micro-management stan-
dards (an intangible capital). The advantage of FDI investors in their
cream-skimming skills is less pronounced when corporate transparency and
capital market institutions are of high quality; in which case FDI inows are
less abundant.1
This chapter also suggests that the gains from FDI to the host country
are reected in a more e¢ cient size of the stock of domestic capital and its
allocation across rms. Domestic rms that are controlled by FDI investors
are typically the cream(high-productivity rms). The magnitude of these
non-traditional gains from trade that arise in our setup depends crucially
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(and inversely) on the degree of competition among potential FDI investors
over the domestic rms. The non-traditional gains can vanish entirely if
there is no such competition. Also, FDI inows could make the size of
the aggregate stock of domestic capital larger than otherwise (under some
plausible assumptions).
This result is consistent with some recent empirical evidence. For in-
stance, Borenzstein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998) and Bosworth and Collins
(1999) provide such evidence for a sample of developing countries during the
period 1978-1995. More recently, in a sample of developing countries, Razin
(2005) nds that the e¤ect of FDI inows on domestic investment is signi-
cantly larger than other forms of foreign ows of capital.2 He also provides
evidence that FDI inows promote e¢ ciency: The e¤ect of FDI on GDP
growth is higher than the e¤ect of other forms of foreign investment. In
Part Three we also provide an empirical illustration of some implications of
the analysis presented here. It demonstrates how host-country transparency,
relative to the source-country transparency, a¤ects bilateral FDI ows from
source to host countries; either through the source-host selection channel, or
by a¤ecting the intensity of the FDI ows.
3.2 FDI and Skimming High-Productivity Firms
As we abstracted here from the issue of the endogenous formation of FDI
(and PFI) investors, we simplify the analysis by switching from the three-
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period framework of the preceding chapter to a two-period setup. Assume a
large number (N) of ex   ante identical domestic rms in an industry. As
before, each rm employs capital input (K) in the rst period, in order to
produce a single composite good in the second period. We assume that
capital depreciates at the rate (< 1). Output in the second period is equal
to F (K)(1+"), where F is a production function, which exhibits diminishing
marginal productivity of capital.3 The term " is a rm-specic productivity
factor. We assume that " is bounded from below by  1, so that output is
always non-negative. For notational ease, we also assume that " is bounded
from above by 1. Suppose that " is purely idiosyncratic, so that there is
no aggregate uncertainty in the model. As before, consumers-investors are
well diversied and will thus behave in a risk-neutral way. We denote by G
the cumulative distribution function of ", and by g = G0 the corresponding
density function.
At the starting point of the agents decision process, the productivity
factor (") of each rm is not revealed with full accuracy. Rather, each rm
receives a signal "0 about its productivity, which is common knowledge.4 The
true " of the rm is within an interval of  around "0. Formally, given "0 the
true value of " is distributed according to the distribution of the productivity
factor, conditional on its being in the interval ("0 ; "0+). The conditional
distribution is therefore:
'("="0) =
G(") G("0   )
G("0 + ) G("0   ) : (3.1)
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This conditional distribution denotes the cumulative distribution function of
", conditional on the signal "0. We assume that the signal "0 is distributed
according to the distribution function G.
The rm chooses the level of the capital stock (and investment), denoted
byK("0), after the signal "0 is received, so as to maximize its expected market
value, conditional on "0. This maximized value is:
V ("0) =
"0+Z
"0 

F [K("0)](1 + ") + (1  )K("0)
1 + r
  [K("0)  (1  )K0]

d'("="0);
(3.2)
where (1   )K0 is the initial stock of capital, and r is the world rate of
interest.5 (Free mobility of debt ows xes the domestic interest rate at the
world rate.) The optimal stock of capital in this case, K("0), is implicitly
dened by the rst-order condition:
"0+Z
"0 

F 0(K)(1 + ") + (1 + )
1 + r
  1

d'("="0) = 0:
This expression can be simplied to:
F 0[K("0)][1 + E("="0)] = r + ; (3.3)
where E("="0) is the conditional expected value of the productivity factor,
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given that this factor lies within the interval ("0   ; "0 + ), that is:
E("="0) =
Z "0+
"0 
"d'("="0): (3.4)
The level of capital K("0) is based on an imprecise signal "0 rather than on
the true productivity of the rm. We refer to it as a signal-based optimal
stock of capital, to distinguish it from what will be dened later as the
productivity-dependent optimal stock of capital, which depends directly on
the true productivity of the rm, .
Suppose that there is a screening (or search) technology, which, at some
xed cost per rm, can elicit the true value of the productivity factor of the
rm, ". A potential buyer can apply the technology after she acquires and
then gains control of the domestic rm. We assume that foreign direct in-
vestors have a cutting-edge advantage over domestic investors in extracting
information about the true value of the rm. If foreign direct investors ac-
quire a domestic rm, they can apply their superior micro-management skills
in order to elicit the true value of ". This advantage stems from some sort of
intangible capital(specialized knowledge) in this particular industry. The
basic idea is that rms get involved in foreign operations in order to exploit
this unique advantage that they have accumulated over time in their source
country. The advantage is modeled here by specifying a lower screening cost
for foreign direct investors than for domestic investors. Formally, the cost
per rm for a foreign direct investor is CF , which is assumed to be lower
3.2. FDI AND SKIMMING HIGH-PRODUCTIVITY FIRMS 63
than CD, the corresponding cost for a domestic direct investor (i.e., a domes-
tic investor who gains and acquires control of the domestic rm). This sort
of comparative advantage is industry based, and is therefore not conned
solely to ows of FDI from developed to developing countries. Thus, this
sort of comparative advantage can explain also two-way FDI ows among
(multi-industry) developed countries.
If the true value of " were to be known, then the rm would choose an
optimal capital stock, denoted by K("), according to the marginal produc-
tivity condition:
F 0 [K(")] (1 + ") = r + : (3.5)
This stock of capital is referred to as the productivity-dependent stock of
capital.
Given the signal "0, a potential foreign direct investor knows that the true
value of " must lie between "0    and "0 + , and that she will be able to
elicit the true value of " if she purchases the rm, at a cost CF . Therefore,
her gross bid price, given the signal "0, is given by:
P ("0) =
"0+Z
"0 

F [K(")](1 + ") + (1  )K(")
1 + r
  [K(")  (1  )K0]

d'("="0):
(3.6)
Her net bid price is then P ("0)   CF . Because CF is smaller than CD, the
bid price of the foreign direct investor is higher than that of the domestic
investor. When foreign direct investors are abundant, competition among
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them will indeed drive up the price of the domestic rms to P ("0)  CF .6
Given the signal "0, the value of information to the FDI investor (that
is, the value of eliciting the true productivity of the rm) is P ("0)  V ("0) >
0. To see that indeed P ("0) > V ("0), note that in calculating P ("0) it is
assumed that K is optimally adjusted for the true value of the productivity,
whereas in calculating V ("0) it is required that K("0) is xed across all rms
in the  interval around "0. The associated cost of gaining the information
is denoted by CF . In order to incur this cost, the value of information
must exceed this cost. Naturally, one would expect the value of information
to rise with "0. This is because, given the signal "0, the deviations of the
productivity-independent signal-based K("0) over the interval ("0 ; "0+),
from the productivity-dependent K(") over this interval, and consequently
the deviations of F (K("0)) from F (K("0)) over this interval, are magnied by
the productivity factor 1+ ". We therefore assume indeed that P ("0) V ("0)
rises with "0.7 Hence, there exists a cuto¤ level of the signal, denoted by "
0
0,
such that for all "0 < "
0
0, the bid-ask price di¤erential P ("
0
)  CF   V ("0) is
negative and, similarly, for all "0 > "00; the bid-ask price di¤erential is positive.
Thus, all the rms that receive a low-productivity signal will be retained by
the original (domestic) owners, whereas all the rms that receive a high-
productivity signal will be acquired by foreign direct investors, who manage
to outbid their domestic counterparts concerning the high-productivity rms.
The cuto¤ level of the signal depends on the screening cost C; and is dened
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implicitly by:
P
h
"
0
0(C)
i
  C = V
h
"
0
0(C)
i
: (3.7)
With FDI investors who can do the screening at a cost CF per rm, the cuto¤
level of the signal is a function of CF ; denoted by "
0
0F  "00(CF ).
The assumption that P ("0)   V ("0) rises with "0 implies also that as the
screening cost (CF ) of the FDI investors falls, the cuto¤ productivity level
(that is, "
0
0F ) declines as well. This means that with a fall in CF , more rms
will be acquired by FDI investors. Therefore, a lower screening cost of FDI
investors gives rise to a larger volume of FDI inows.8 By the same token, as
the signal becomes more accurate (that is, as  becomes smaller), the benet
of the screening technology, which is P ("0) V ("0), declines. We may interpret
a more accurate signal as an improvement in corporate transparency. The
advantage of FDI investors in their cream-skimming skills is less pronounced
when host-country corporate transparency improves,9 and FDI inows are
expected to be less abundant. After the signals are revealed, then a rm
with a signal "0, below "
0
0F , actually adjusts its capital stock to the signal-
dependent, productivity-independent level K("0). But a rm, which receives
a signal "0 above "
0
0F , expects to adjust its capital stock to a productivity-
dependent level K(") with a cumulative distribution function '("="0). The
expected value of its capital stock, denoted by E[K(")="0] is given by:
E[K(")="0] =
"0+Z
"0 
K(")d'("="0): (3.8)
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Thus, the total expected value of the stock of capital (before signals are
revealed) is:
KF =
"
0
0FZ
 1
K("0)dG("0) +
1Z
"
0
0F
E[(K(")="0]dG("0): (3.9)
This is our measure of the size of domestic capital.
3.3 FPI Inows Versus FDI Inows
To understand the unique role played by FDI, suppose now that instead
of FDI inows there are only FPI inows. Note that portfolio investors
(whether foreign or domestic) do not acquire control and management. That
is, they do not incur the screening cost and do not elicit the true productivity
parameter ": In this case, only domestic direct investors acquire and gain
control of the rms with the high-productivity signals. Domestic and FPI
investors will acquire all the other rms with low-productivity signals. The
cuto¤ level of the signal in this case is "
0
0D  "00(CD). Because CD > CF ,
it follows that "
0
0F < "
0
0D [see equation (3.7) and recall that P ("
0)   V ("0)
is increasing in "0, by assumption]. Thus, the di¤erence in investment in
capacity between the two regimes lies only in the range of signals between
"
0
0F and "
0
0D. The capital stock of a rm with a signal below "
0
0F is the same
in the two regimes. The expected capital stock of a rm with a signal above
"
0
0D will also be the same in the two regimes. But a rm, which receives a
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signal "0 in-between these two cuto¤ levels, will invest a signal-dependent,
productivity-independent K("0) in the foreign portfolio-investment regime,
compared to a productivity-dependent schedule, K("), with a cumulative
distribution '("="0), in the FDI regime. Naturally, the latter is more e¢ cient,
in the sense that it yields a higher expected return.10
3.3.1 Gains to the Host Country
The economic gains from FDI, relative to FPI inows, consist of the e¢ ciency
of investment and the lower screening cost of FDI investors. Note that be-
cause the same world interest rate, r, prevails in the home country in the two
regimes, it follows that the gains from FDI relative to FPI in our case do not
include the traditional gains from opening up the domestic capital market
to foreign capital inows. (Evidently, the traditional gains are present also
in the portfolio regime.) In the FDI regime the rms with signals above the
cuto¤ signal "
0
0F are screened; whereas in the FPI regime a smaller set of
rms, namely only the rms with signals above "
0
0D are screened (recall that
"
0
0D > "
0
0F ). Therefore, the gains to the host country stemming from the
e¢ ciency of investment is:
GAINE =
"
0
0DZ
"00F
[P ("0)  CF   V ("0)]dG("0). (3.10)
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In addition, for the rms that are screened in the two regimes (that is, the
rms with signals above "
0
0D), the screening cost is lower under the FDI
regime than under the portfolio ow regime. This gives rise to further gains
from FDI, which are
GAINC = (CD   CF )[1 G("00D)]: (3.11)
Observe that the entire gain, attributable to the lower screening cost of
FDI investors, is captured by the host country because of the assumed per-
fect competition among the FDI investors over the domestic rms.
Competition among FDI investors must drive up the price they pay for a
domestic rm to their net bid-price [that is, P ("0)  CF ], which exceeds the
ask-price of the domestic owners [that is, V ("0)]; except for the cuto¤ rm
(for which the bid price and ask price are equal to each other). Thus, the
total gain to the host country from FDI is
GAINE +GAINC =
"
0
0DZ
"
0
OF
[P ("0)  CF   V ("0)]dG("0) (3.12)
+(CD   CF )[1 G("00D)]:
Note, however, that in the extreme opposite case of a monopoly, the single
FDI investor will never o¤er a price for a domestic rm above the price that
will be o¤ered by domestic investors, which is P ("0) CD, as long as this price
is above, or equal, to the ask price of the domestic owner, which is V ("0).
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Thus, the price at which the foreign direct investor buys a domestic rm with
a signal "0 is Max[P ("0)   CD; V ("0)]. Because P ("00D)   CD = V ("00D), it
follows that P ("0) CD < V ("0) in the interval ("00F ; "00D). This means that in
this interval the domestic rms are purchased by the foreign direct investor
at the ask price V ("0). Hence, the e¢ ciency gain of investment, GAINE,
vanishes. Similarly, rms in the interval ["
0
0D; 1] must be purchased at the
price P ("0)   CD [rather than P ("0)   CF in the competitive case]. Hence,
GAINC vanishes as well. Thus, as expected, the entire gain from FDI accrues
to the single FDI investor. Evidently, this is an extreme case. If there is an
additional domestic input, say labor, the host country still gains, even in the
case of a single FDI investor, through infra-marginal gains to domestic labor.
However, these gains are sharply smaller than what they could have been in
the case of competitive FDI investors.
To retain some of the gains of FDI, a possible remedy for the host country
is to impose some sort of a oor on the sale prices of domestic rms. Another
partial remedy for the host country is to impose a (source-based) capital gains
tax on FDI investors. In the intermediate case of imperfect competition
among a few FDI investors, but not a strict monopoly, the gains from FDI
are split between the host country and the FDI investors.
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3.3.2 The Size of Investment in Capacity in the Host
Country
We have already established that the allocation of the capital stock (its ag-
gregate level and distribution over rms) is more e¢ cient in the FDI regime
than in the portfolio regime. Is the capital stock also larger in the FDI regime
than in the FPI regime? Recall that the fundamental di¤erence between the
two regimes is the screening cost C. Therefore, rephrasing the question one
can ask whether a decline in the search cost increases the aggregate stock
of capital. In order to answer this question, we write the aggregate stock of
capital as a function of C, as follows [see equation (3.9)]:
K(C) =
Z "00(C)
 1
K("0)dG("0) +
Z 1
"
0
0(C)
E[K(")="0[dG("0); (3.13)
where, "
0
0(C); K("
0) and E[K(")="0] are dened by equations (3.7), (3.3) and
(3.8), respectively.
Now, di¤erentiate K(C) with respect to C, to get:
d K(C)
dC
= fK
h
"
0
0(C)
i
  E
h
K(")="
0
0(C)
i
gg
h
"
0
0(C)
i d"00(C)
dC
: (3.14)
From equations (3.3) and (3.5) we can conclude that
K
h
"
0
0(C)
i
= H fE ["="00(C)]g ; (3.15)
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and
K(") = H("),
where the function H() is dened by
H(x) = (F 0) 1

r + 
1  x

;
and where the function (F 0) 1 denotes the inverse of F 0. Thus, we can
rewrite equation (3.14) as:
d K
dC
= (H
n
E
h
"="
0
0(C)
io
  E
h
H(")="
0
0(C)
i
)g
h
"
0
0(C)
i d"00(C)
dC
: (3.16)
If the function H() is convex, then it follows from Jensens inequality that
d K=dC is negative (because d"
0
0=dC > 0). Indeed, one may plausibly as-
sume that H is convex (for instance, this is the case with a Cobb-Douglas
production function), in which case d K=dC < 0. That is: The size of invest-
ment in capacity is larger under the regime of FDI inows than under the
regime of FPI inows.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we develop a model in which foreign direct investors are
better equipped to cream skim domestic projects than their direct domestic
and portfolio counterparts, due to rich experience in the skimming of good
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rms. Employing this advantage, foreign direct investors are able to outbid
direct domestic and portfolio investors for the good rms. Better hands-on
management standards, which characterize FDI investors, entails a cutting-
edge advantage over portfolio investors in reacting in real time to a changing
business environment. This feature is naturally more pronounced in high-
productivity rms, resulting in the acquisition of high-productivity rms by
FDI investors. This mechanism applies both to mergers and acquisitions and
to green-eld investments. The productivity signal, though, is likely to be
coarser in the latter, conveying less information about the true productivity.
Thus, the advantage of the FDI investors over their domestic direct investors
counterparts is even more pronounced in the case of green-eld investments
than in mergers and acquisition.
We emphasize that FDI as distinct from FPI investment with respect to
the quality of monitoring management. Foreign direct investors, by den-
ition, acquire some signicant control over the rm they invest in, whereas
portfolio investors, plagued by free-rider problems, have no control. Conse-
quently, foreign direct investors can apply hands-on management (or micro-
management) standards that would enable them to react in real time to
changing economic environments. This feature may stem from intangible
capitalaccumulated through a specialization by the foreign direct investors
in a certain niche.11 Indeed, there is some micro evidence in support of this
hypothesis. For example, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) report that foreign
direct investors pick the high-productivity rms in transition economies. Sim-
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ilarly, Gri¢ th and Simpson (2003) nd that foreign-owned manufacturing
establishments in Britain, over the period 1980 to 1996, have signicantly
higher labor productivity than those that remain under domestic owner-
ship.12 Britain is not an exception as a developed country attracting FDI.
In fact, the vast majority of FDI ows among developed countries. The
model in this chapter is relevant when a developed country may specialize in
certain niches and gain cutting-edge advantages in these niches over another
developed country. The opposite may apply in some other niches.
In Razin and Sadka (2005), we provide some illustrative evidence on the
e¤ects of transparency on FDI ows. Transparency is proxied by account-
ing standards, creditors rights, etc.; see La Porta et al (1998). Consistent
with the theoretical predictions of this chapter, less transparency in the host
country, relative to the source country, encourages FDI.
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Notes
1See also Wei (2000), Razin and Sadka (2003), and Albuquerque (2003).
2See also Chapter One.
3Here we specify separately the output (gross revenue) and the cost of the
rm rather than just the net cash ow, as in Chapter Two.
4One can think of this signal as sort of encapsulated information about the
rms productivity, which is reported by its up-to-date nancial statements.
5Because of the assumption that there is a single composite good, which
serves both for investment and for consumption, it is irrelevant whether the
optimal K is above or below (1  )K0.
6Presumably, foreign direct investors bring specic skills that entail them
a cutting-edge screening advantage. Therefore, these skilled investors may
not be abundant. The case of less than perfect competition among foreign
direct investors is analyzed later in this chapter.
7We conjecture that this can be proved for a wide range of distribution
and production functions. However, we were unable to characterize this range
of functions. In any event, this assumption is irrelevant to our main point
that FDI investors choose a more e¢ cient level of capital than domestic
investors. In case this assumption does not hold, that is P ("0)   V ("0) is
not monotonically increasing in "0, then the FDI investors do not necessarily
acquire only the top productivity rms.
8We refer to the sum of the acquisition price of the rm and the investment
NOTES 75
in its capacity (that is nanced by the FDI owner) as FDI inows.
9Indeed, these results also hold in Bursteins (2003) example, albeit with
a di¤erent stochastic specication.
10We have assumed that the only advantage of FDI investors over direct
domestic investors lies in the search/screening cost. Naturally, if we were to
assume that FDI investors can also obtain better information about the true
" (we have assumed that both can accurately elicit "), then the di¤erence
between the two regimes may expand to the entire range of [ 1; 1] of signals.
11See Gopinath (2004) for a di¤erent application of a search model for a
study of FDI ows into developing economies.
12In addition, labor productivity improves faster over time and faster with
age in foreign-owned establishments. Other studies found that this phenom-
enon is accounted for by the greater capital intensity of multinationals. For
an overview see Lipsey (2002).
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Chapter 4
FDI Flows with Endogenous
Domestic Wages: Heterogenous
Firms
4.1 Introduction
So far we focused on the host country as a recipient of FDI and other ows in
a partial equilibrium context in which domestic input prices are xed. Specif-
ically, labor inputs and wages were xed and therefore ignored. Naturally,
the ows of FDI a¤ect the domestic stock of capital. Therefore, even though
the return to capital may be tied through capital mobility to the world rate of
interest, wages may still vary. This chapter addresses the general-equilibrium
interaction between wages and FDI. We cast this interaction in a bilateral
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source-host country setup.
4.2 Wage Determination
Consider a pair of countries, "host" and "source", in a world of free capi-
tal mobility which xes the world rate of interest, denoted by r. We will
now describe the host country, whose economic variables will be subscripted
by "H". The description of the source country is similar with a subscript
"S". Variables with neither an H nor S subscript are identical for the two
countries. There is a representative industry whose product serves both for
consumption and investment. As before, rms last for two periods. In the
rst period there exists a continuum of NH rms which di¤er from each other
by a productivity factor ". The number NH of rms (or entrepreneurs) is
xed. We refer to a rm which has a productivity factor of " as an " rm.
The cumulative distribution function of " is denoted by G(:); with a density
function g(:):
As before, we assume for simplicity that the initial net capital stock of
each rm is the same and denote it by (1   )K0H , where  is the rate of
physical depreciation. If an " rm invests I in the rst period, it augments
its capital stock to K = (1   )K0H + I, and its gross output in the second
period will be AHF (K;L)(1 + "), where L is the labor input (in e¤ective
units) and AH is a country (H) - specic productivity parameter. Note that
" is rm-specic, whereas AH is country-specic.
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As before, we assume that there exists a xed setup cost of investment,
CH ; which is the same for all rms (that is, independent of "). We assume
that, due to some (suppressed) xed factor, F is strictly concave, exhibiting
diminishing returns to scale in K and L. Note that the average cost curve
of the rm is U-shaped, so that perfect competition, which we assume, can
prevail.1 Consider an "-rm which does invest in the rst period an amount
I = K  (1  )K0H in order to augment its stock of capital to K. Its present
value becomes V +(AH ; K0H ; "; wH)  CH ; where
V +(AH ; K
0
H ; "; wH) = max
(K;L)

AHF (K;L)(1 + ")  wL+K
1 + r
  (K  K0H)

;
(4.1)
and where we assume for notational simplicity that  = 0.
The demands of such a rm for K and L are denoted by K+(AH ; "; wH)
and L+(AH ; "; wH). They are given by the marginal productivity conditions:
AHFK(K;L)(1 + ") = r; (4.2)
and
AHFL(K;L)(1 + ") = wH ; (4.3)
where FK and FL denote the partial derivatives of F with respect to K and
L, respectively. As before, we assume that " is bounded from below by -1,
so that output is always nonnegative; and bounded from above by one.
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Note, however, that an "-rm may chose not to invest at all [that is, to
stick to its existing stock of capital (KOH)] and avoid the lumpy setup cost
CH . Naturally, a rm with a low " may not nd it worthwhile to incur the
setup cost CH . In this case, its present value is:
V  (AH ; K0H ; "; wH) = max
L

AHF (K
0
H ; L)(1 + ")  wHL+K0H
1 + r

: (4.4)
The labor demand of such a rm, denoted by L (AH ; KOH ; "; wH); is dened
by:
AHFL(K
O
H ; L)(1 + ") = wH : (4.5)
It is straightforward to show that (@V +=@")  (@V  =@") > 0 (see Appen-
dix 4A.1). Therefore, there exists a cuto¤ level of ", denoted by "0; such that
an "-rm will make a new investment, if " > "0. This cuto¤ level of " depends
on AH ; CH ; K0H ; and wH . We write the cuto¤ " as "0(AH ; CH ; K
0
H ; wH): It is
dened implicitly by:
V +(AH ; K
0
H ; "0; wH)  CH = V  (AH ; K0H ; "0; wH): (4.6)
That is, the cuto¤ productivity level is the level at which the rm is just
indi¤erent between making a new investment and incuring the setup cost or
sticking to its existing capital stock.
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The wage rate wH is determined in equilibrium by a clearance in the labor
market. We assume that labor is conned within national borders. Denoting
the countrys endowment of labor in e¤ective units by ~L0H , we have the
following labor market-clearing equation:
NH
"0(AH ;CH ;K
0
H ;wH)Z
 1
L (AH ; K0H ; "; wH)g(")d"+
NH
1Z
"0(AH ;CH ;K
0
H ;wH)
L+(AH ; "; wH)g(")d" = ~L
0
H :
(4.7)
Dividing the latter equation through by NH , yields:
"0(AH ;CH ;K
0
H ;wH)Z
 1
L (AH ; K0H ; "; wH)g(")d"
+
1Z
"0(AH ;CH ;K
0
H ;wH)
L+(AH ; "; wH)g(")d" = L
0
H ;
(4.8)
where L0H  ~L0H=NH is the e¤ective labor per rm.
Note that no similar market-clearing equation is specied for capital,
because we assume that capital is freely mobile internationally, and its rate
of return is equalized internationally. The same description with the subscript
"S" replacing "H" holds for the source country.
Note that di¤erences in labor abundance between the two countries are
manifested in the wage di¤erences. To see this, suppose that the two countries
are identical, except that e¤ective labor per rm is more abundant in the
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host country than in the source country, that is: L0H > L
0
S. Note also that
the number of rms in the economy is also a measure of the abundance of
entrepreneurship. Thus, the abundance (respectively, scarcity) of labor is
also relative to the scarcity (respectively, abundance) of entrepreneurship. If
wages were equal in the two countries, then e¤ective labor demand per rm
were equal and the market-clearing condition [equation (4.7)] could not hold
for both countries. Because of the diminishing marginal product of labor,
it follows that the wage in the relatively labor-abundant country is lower
than in the relatively labor-scarce country, that is: wH < wS2. Thus, equal
returns to capital (through capital mobility coexist with unequal wages3.
This provide a complementary reconciliation of the Lucas (1990) paradox of
why capital does not ow from rich to poor countries.4
4.3 M&A and Greeneld Investments
One may think of FDI as the investment of source-country entrepreneurs
in the acquisition of host-country rms. Suppose that the source-country
entrepreneurs are endowed with some "intangible" capital, or known-how,
stemming from their specialization or expertise in the industry at hand. As
before, we model this comparative advantage by assuming that the setup
cost of investment in the host country, when investment is done by source-
country entrepreneurs (FDI investors) is only CH ; which is below CH (the
setup cost of investment when carried out by the host country direct in-
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vestors). As before, this cost advantage implies that the foreign investors
can bid up the direct investors of the host country in the purchase of the
investing rms in the host country. Each such rm [that is, each rm whose
" is above "0(AH ; CH ; K
0
H ; wH)] is purchased at its market value, which is
V +(AH ; K
0
H ; "; wH) CH . This essentially assumes that competition among
the foreign direct investors shift all the gains from their lower setup cost to
the host-country original owners of the rm. The new owners also invest an
amount K+(AH ; "; wH) K0H in the rm. Thus, the amount of foreign direct
investment made in an " rm (where " > "0) is:
FDI(AH ; C

H ; K
0
H ; "; wH) = V
+(AH ; K
0
H ; "; wH) CH+K+(AH ; "; wH) K0H :
(4.9)
This specication assumes that the setup cost CH is incurred in the source
country and does not therefore constitute a part of the denition of FDI.
It conforms with the notion that CH represents, for instance, R&D of a new
product line carried out by the parent rm in the source country.5 Aggregate
FDI is given by
FDI(AH ; C

H ; K
0
H ; wH) =
1Z
"0(AH ;C

H ;K
0
H ;wH)
FDI(AH ; C

H ; K
0
H ; "; wH)g(")d":
(4.10)
Suppose rst that wH is xed. Note that it follows from equation (4.1)
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that @V +=@K0H = 1, by the envelope theorem. Therefore, @(FDI)=@K
0
H = 0,
by equation (4.9). Thus, the amount of FDI in a rm whose " is above "0
does not depend on the initial capital stock, K0H : an increase of $ 1 in the
initial stock of capital of such a rm increases the value of the rm by 1$,
but decreases the required new investment by the same amount, so that FDI
does not change6. However, the aggregate amount of FDI diminishes, when
the initial stock of capital (K0H) rises. This is because fewer rms will make
new investment and be purchased by foreign direct investors, that is, the
cuto¤ "0 rises, when K0H rises. To see this, di¤erentiate equation (4.10) with
respect to K0H to get :
@FDI
@K0H
=  FDI(AH ; CH ; K0H ; "0; wH)g("0)
@"0
@K0H
< 0; (4.11)
because @"0
@K0H
> 0 (see Appendix 4A.1).
Similarly, it follows from equation (4.10) that:
@FDI
@CH
= ( 1) [1 G("0)]  FDI(AH ; CH ; K0H ; "0; wH)g("0)
@"0
@CH
: (4.12)
Note that @"0
@CH
> 0; see Appendix 4A.1. Hence, it follows that @FDI
@CH
< 0:
It also follows from equation (4.10) that
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@FDI
@AH
=

F (K+; L+)
1 + r
+
@K+
@AH

[1 G("0)]
 FDI(AH ; CH ; K0H ; "0; wH)g("0)
@"0
@AH
> 0;
(4.13)
because @K
+
@AH
> 0 and @"0
@AH
< 0; see Appendix 4A.1.
Thus, a lower level of the initial stock of capital in the host country
attracts more foreign direct investment. Similarly, a lower level of the setup
cost of investment in the host country for the FDI investors from the source
country promotes more FDI7. Also, a higher country-specic productivity
factor in the host country promotes more FDI. These conclusions were drawn
under the assumption that the wage (wH) in the host country is xed. When
it is not xed, then lower K0H and/or C

H attract more FDI and push the
wage rate upward, thereby mitigating the initial increase in FDI, but not
eliminating it altogether.
Observe that FDI ows constitute only a fraction of the international
capital transactions between the host and source countries. In a globalized
world capital market, where the world rate of interest is given to our pair
of countries, domestic saving and domestic investment are not equal to each
other, and FDI is not equal to either saving or investment.
So far, FDI took the form of mergers or acquisitions of existing rms.
Consider now the possibility of establishing a new rm (that is, a greeneld
FDI, where K0 = 0). Suppose that the newcomer entrepreneur does not
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know in advance the productivity factor (") of the potential rm. The en-
trepreneur therefore takes G(.) as the cumulative probability distribution
of the productivity factor of the new rm. However, we assume that " is
revealed to the entrepreneur, before she decides whether or not to make new
investment. The expected value of the new rm is therefore:
V (A;C;w) =
1Z
 1
Max

V +(A; "; w)  C; 0	 g(")d": (4.14)
Note that if K0 is equal to zero, only the rms with an " high enough to
justify a greeneld investment have a positive value. This explains equation
(4.14).
Now suppose that greeneld entrepreneurship is in limited supply and
capacity. An entrepreneur in a source country (and there is a limited number
of them) may have to decide whether to establish a new rm at home (the
source country) or abroad (the host country), but not in both. Her decision is
naturally determined by where V (), as dened in equation (4.14), is higher.
She will invest in the host country rather than in the source country if, and
only if,
V (AH ; wH)  CH > V (AS; wS)  CS: (4.15)
Naturally, the lower wage rate in the host country works as a pull factor for
that country, that is, it works in the direction of satisfying condition (4.15).
Thus, the lower wage rate in the host country attracts greeneld FDI. On the
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other hand, if the total factor productivity in the source country (namely,
AS) is higher than its counterpart in the host country (namely, AH), this
discourages FDI. Assuming that the wage di¤erential dominates the total
factor productivity di¤erential, the host country attracts greeneld FDI from
the source country.
Assuming that newcomer entrepreneurs evolve gradually over time and
that technology spillover equates total factor productivity, eventually this
process may end up with full factor price equalization. Naturally, the capital-
labor ratios and L  eL=N are equalized in such long-run steady state. This
all happens even though labor is not internationally mobile. The establish-
ment of new rms in the global economy may be an engine for FDI ows by
multinationals.
Our two-country model, which generates capital ows from the source to
the host country, can be extended in a straightforward manner to explain
two-way FDI ows. By assuming more than one industry, the extension
allows two-way ows between two rich countries, when each country has a
setup cost advantage in a di¤erent industry.
4.4 Conclusion
The existence of setup costs of FDI presents the investors with a two-fold
decision: whether or where to invest at all, and, if so, how much to invest.
Consider some source-host country pair. A comparative advantage of parent
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companies in the source country with respect to R&D of a new product line
or some other setup cost comparative advantage due to specialization, etc.
enhance the likelihood of embarking on a new FDI and raises its volume.
This is relevant mainly for FDI in form of M&A.
A greeneld investment, which takes the form of establishing a new rm
rather than just acquiring and expanding the capital stock of an existing
rm, works to close the wage gap between the source and the host countries.
This occurs with the evolving over time of new supply of entrepreneurship.
The new entrepreneurs must choose whether to keep their talent at home
(the source country) or utilize it abroad (at the host country) in establishing
a greeneld FDI. The limited supply of entrepreneurs gives rise to a discrete
choice about the location of new rms.
We account for these forms of FDI ows in a general-equilibrium context
of endogenous wages. This framework gives also rise to a coexistence of equal
rates of return to capital across countries, due to free capital mobility, and
wage gaps as in Lucas (1990).
Appendix 4A.1: Some Comparable Statics Deriva-
tions
(i) The E¤ect of the Firms Productivity on its Market Value
An "-rm will choose to incur the setup cost of a new investment, if and
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only if
V +(AH ; K
0
H ; "; wH)  CH > V  (AH ; K0H ; "; wH):
It follows from the envelope theorem that
@V +
@"
  @V
 
@"
=
AH
1 + r
fF [K+(AH ; "; wH); L+(AH ; "; wH)]
 F [K0H ; L (AH ; K0H ; "; wH)]g:
(4A.1)
We assume that K+(AH ; "; wH) > K0H
8: Assuming further that capital and
labor are complementary in production (that is, FKL > 0), it follows from
equation (4.5) that L+(AH ; "; wH) > L (AH ; K0H ; "; wH): Thus,
F [K+(AH ; "; wH); L
+(AH ; "; wH)] > F [K
0
H ; L
 (AH ; K0H ; "; wH)]: (4A.2)
Hence, @V
+
@"
  @V  
@"
> 0:
(ii) The E¤ect of the Initial Stock of Capital and the Setup
Cost on the Cuto¤ Productivity Level
It follows from equation (4.6) that
@"0
@K0H
=
@V  
@K0H
  @V +
@K0H
@V +
@"
  @V  
@"
=
1
1+r
+ AHFK(K
0
H ; L
 )(1 + "0)  1
AHFK(K+;L+)
1+r
  AHFK(K0H ;L )
1+r
: (4A.3)
Note that AHFK(K0H ; L
 )(1 + "0) > r, as the rm retains its K0H rather
than invest in order to equalize the marginal product of capital to the rate
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of interest. Note also that the denominator in equation (4A.3) is positive;
see condition (4A.2). Thus, @"0
@K0H
> 0:
Similarly, it follows from equation (4.6) that
@"0
@CH
=
 1
@V +
@"
  @V  
@"
< 0: (4A.4)
(iii) The E¤ect of the Host-Country Specic Productivity
Level on FDI
By total di¤erentiation of equations (4.2) and (4.3) with respect to AH ;
we nd that:
@K+
@AH
=
 FKFLL + FKLFL
AH(FKKFLL   F 2KL)
> 0; (4A.5)
because the denominator and -FLL are positive by the strict concavity of F;
and FKL is positive by the factor-complementary assumption.
It similarly follows from equation (4.6) that
sign

@"0
@AH

= sign

@V  
@AH
  @V
+
@AH

= sign

F (K0H ; L
 )  F (K+; L+) ;
(4A.6)
which is negative. Thus, @"0
@AH
< 0:
4.4. CONCLUSION 91
Appendix 4A.2: Reconciliation of the Interna-
tional Flow Paradox according to Lucas
Lucas (1990) employs a standard concave constant-returns-to-scale produc-
tion function:
Y = AF (K;L); (4A.7)
where Y is output, K is capital and L is e¤ective labor. The latter is used in
order to allow for di¤erences in the human capital content of labor between
developed and developing countries. The parameter A is a productivity index
which may reect the average level of human capital in the country, external
to the rm. In addition, A may reect the stock of public capital (roads
and other infrastructure) that is external to the rm. In per e¤ective-labor
terms, we have:
y  Y=L = AF (K=L; 1)  Af(k): (4A.8)
The return to capital (r) is:
r = Af 0(k); (4A.9)
whereas the wage per e¤ective unit of labor (w) is:
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w = A[f(k)  kf 0(k)]: (4A.10)
Let a variable with an asterisk (*) stand for a rich (developed) country
and a variable without an asterisk for a poor (developing) country. The
function f is common to all countries. Initially, before there is any capital
mobility, the returns to capital is higher in the rich country than in the poor
country: r0 < r0: But when capital can freely move from the rich to the poor
country, then the rates of return are equalized, so that:
r = Af 0(k) = Af 0(k) = r: (4A.11)
Lucas essentially assumes that A > A (because of a human-capital ex-
ternality). Hence, it follows from equation (4A.11) that k > k (because of
a diminishing marginal product of capital). Therefore, employing equation
(4A.10), it follows that w > w:
That is, at equilibrium, workers can earn higher wages (per e¤ective la-
bor) in the rich country than in the poor country, and administrative means
(migration quotas) are employed to impede the ow of labor from poor to
rich countries. Yet, there is no pressure on capital to ow in the opposite
direction, because rates-of-return to capital are equalized.
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Notes
1With constant returns to scale, the xed cost will entail diminishing
average cost curve, in which case perfect competition cannot be sustained.
Were we to assume that entry is free, one could have constant returns to
scale at the industry level.
2The equilibrium wage gap implies that the host country employs more
workers per rm than the source country. Thus, even though the productivity
distribution across rms is assumed equal, the source country is e¤ectively
more productive in equilibrium.
3See also Amiti (2005) who studies the e¤ect of agglomeration on cross-
regional wage di¤erences. See also Melitz (2003) for the role of xed costs
in intra-industry reallocations in reaction to industry-specic productivity
shocks.
4See appendix 4A.2 for a brief description of the paradox posed by Lucas
and his reconciliation of it.
5Whether we interpret CH as being carried out in the source country or
in the host country, and accordingly whether we exclude it or include it in
the denition of FDI does not alter our qualitative results.
6This is because, in the absence of a marginal adjustment cost of invest-
ment, the marginal Tobins q is identically equal to one.
7Interestingly, a decline in the setup cost a¤ects the average recorded
productivity, because the cuto¤ " changes. The new spectrum of investing
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rms is accordingly adjusted. A similar endogenous-productivity mechanism
features in Ghironi and Melitz (2004).
8This will be true if the support of G is su¢ ciently bounded away from
-1 or if K0H = 0:
Chapter 5
Country-Specic Aggregate
Shocks: Representative Firm
5.1 Introduction
So far our setup allowed heterogeneity across rms and our analysis has gone
to the details of the rm level. Thus, an empirical investigation based on
this analysis would have required rm-level data. Firm-level data are typ-
ically available only for a small subset of countries and on a cross-section
basis. On the other hand, there is a fairly rich dataset on aggregate bilat-
eral ows. These data enable us to study how cross-country di¤erences in
institutions, macro-policies, productivities, etc. a¤ect bilateral FDI ows.
But these aggregate data do not allow us to infer whether a reduction in
aggregate FDI was caused by each rm reducing its investment or by some
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low-productivity rms cutting their investment altogether (because of the
xed costs). Therefore, in this chapter, which serves also as abridge to the
data, we assume homogeneous rms in each country. In chapter eight we
employ a panel data on both OECD and non-OECD countries, across which
productivity and setup cost may vary considerably, in order to empirically
analyze the determinants of FDI ows.
We concentrate in this chapter on productivity di¤erences across countries
as a key factor that drives FDI ows. A high level of productivity in the
potential source country versus a low level of productivity in the potential
host country would put adverse pressure on FDI ows. We point out that
when we take into account threshold barriers, which are typical for FDI as
we explain in this book, then this simple prescription needs some substantial
modications. We show that the productivity levels in a pair of source-host
countries manifest themselves di¤erently in the two-fold - the selection and
ow - FDI decisions. (Recall that with threshold barriers, a rm must decide
whether to invest at all and not only how much to invest.) Furthermore, the
e¤ects of the productivity shocks depend also on whether FDI is in the form
of M&A or in the form of greeneld investment.
5.2 Country-Specic Productivity Shocks
As we focus on the general productivity level of a country, we abstract from
the heterogeneity across rms within a country, which was assumed before.
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We therefore assume that all rms have the same productivity factor (")
which is embedded henceforth in the aggregate productivity factor A1.
Consider again a representative industry in a given host country (H) in a
world of free capital mobility, which xes the world rate of interest, denoted
by r. As before, there is a single good which serves both for consumption
and investment.
As our focus here is on the country-specic productivity level, we would
like to reckon with the possibility that a productivity change a¤ects wages.
If the setup cost of a new FDI is in part in domestic (host-country) inputs,
we have to take into account the indirect e¤ect of a productivity change on
the setup cost.2 Therefore, we assume that the setup cost is of the form
CH = CSH + wHL
C
H ; (5.1)
where CSH is a cost incurred in the source country and LCH is a xed input
of domestic labor.
Consider a representative rm which does invest in the rst period an
amount I = K   K0H in order to augment its stock of capital to K. Its
present value becomes V +(AH ; wH)  CH , where
V +(AH ; wH) = max
(K;L)

AHF (K;L)  wHL+K
1 + r
  (K  K0H)

: (5.2)
(We again assume for notational simplicity that the rate of physical depreci-
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ation, , is equal to zero.)
The demand of such a rm for K and L are denoted by K+(AH ; wH) and
L+(AH ; wH), respectively. They are dened by the marginal productivity
conditions:
AHFK(K;L) = r; (5.3)
and
AHFL(K;L) = wH : (5.4)
Note again that the representative rm may choose not to invest at all
(that is, to stick to its existing stock of capital K0H) and avoid the lumpy
setup cost CH . In this case its present value is
V  (AH ; K0H ; wH) = max
L

AHF (K
0
H ; L)  wHL+K0H
1 + r

; (5.5)
and its labor demand, denoted by L (AH ; K0H ; wH); is given by
AHFL(K
0
H ; L) = wH : (5.6)
The rm will make a new investment if, and only if,
V +(AH ; wH)  CH  V  (AH ; K0H ; wH): (5.7)
That is, the rm makes the amount of investment that is called for by the
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marginal productivity conditions, (5.3) and (5.4), if and only if, some global
selection condition [(5.7)], is met.
As before, we assume that labor is conned within national borders. De-
noting the countrys endowment of labor by L0H , we have the following labor
market clearing equation:
LCH + L
+(AH ; wH) = L
0
H if V
+(AH ; wH)  CH  V  (AH ; K0H ; wH)
L (AH ; wH) = L0H if V
+(AH ; wH)  CH < V  (AH ; K0H ; wH)
9>=>;
(5.8)
This market clearing equation determines the wage rate in the host coun-
try, as a function wH(AH) of the host-country productivity factor.
5.3 The Conicting E¤ects of the Source- and
Host-Country Productivity Shocks
We now turn to discuss determinants FDI ows from source country S to
host country H. As before, we treat as FDI the investment of source-country
entrepreneurs in the mergers and/or acquisitions of host-country rms. The
source-country entrepreneurs are endowed with some "intangible" capital, or
know-how, stemming from their specialization or expertise in the industry at
hand. This comparative advantage is modelled by assuming that the lumpy
setup cost of investment in the host country, when investment is done by the
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source country entrepreneurs (FDI investors), is below the lumpy setup cost
of investment, when carried out by the host country direct investors. This
means that the foreign direct investors can bid up the direct investors of the
host country in the purchase of the investing rms in the host country. The
representative rm is purchased at its value which is V +[AH ; wH(AH)] CH .
As before, this essentially assumes that competition among the foreign direct
investors pushes the price of the acquired rm to its maximized value. Thus,
the FDI investors shift all the gains from their lower setup cost to the host-
country original owners of the rm. The new owners also invest an amount
K+[AH ; wH(AH)] to expand the capital stock of the acquired the rm. On
the other hand, if the selection condition (5.7) does not hold, then there will
be no FDI ows from country S to country H.
Thus, aggregate foreign direct investment is equal to:
FDI =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
V +[AH ; wH(AH)]  CH + wH(AH)LCH if
+K+[AH ; wH(AH)] K0H V +[AH ; wH(AH)] = V  (AH ; K0H ; wH)
0 if
V +[AH ; wH(AH)] < V
 (AH ; K0H ; wH)
:
(5.9)
Note that the price paid by the FDI investors for the representative rm is
V +   CH . Therefore, the specication in equation (5.9) essentially assumes
that the domestic component of the xed setup cost, wH(AH)LCH , constitutes
a part of the national accounting denition of FDI. It also assumes that the
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capital investment V +   CH + K+   K0 is nanced from abroad. As the
source of nancing is indeterminant in our simple model, our denition of
FDI in the national accounting is irrelevant in our model.
The model thus suggests that if the productivity factor (AH) is su¢ ciently
high, and/or the wage rate (wH) is su¢ ciently low, and/or the setup cost
(CSH +wHL
C
H) is su¢ ciently low, then FDI ows from country S to country
H are positive. Otherwise, the ow of FDI from country S to country H is
zero.
As a preamble to our empirical analysis in the next part, we emphasize
that the models special feature is the two-fold mechanism of FDI decisions.
First, one decides how much to invest abroad, while ignoring the xed setup
cost. Second, a decision is made whether to invest at all, taking into account
this cost. The hallmark of our empirical approach to follow is based on the
two equations (conditions) that govern these decisions.
First, the FDI ows from country S to country H (denoted by FDIN) is
governed by a "notional" ow (or gravity) equation:
FDIN = V
+[AH ; wH(AH)]  CH + wH(AH)LCH +K+[AH ; wH(AH)] K0H :
(5.10)
That is, the quantity of investment is governed by the marginal productivity
conditions (5.3) and (5.4). Note that the representative rm, if forced to
invest in circumstances when it does not pay for it to invest, would have
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invested according to equation (5.10) that is generated by the rst-order
conditions (5.3) and (5.4).
Second, the question whether FDI ows from country S to country H are
at all positive is governed by a "selection" equation (condition):
V +[AH ; wH(AH)]  CH   V  [AH ; K0H ; wH(AH)] = 0: (5.11)
Consider now the e¤ect of an increase in the host countrys productivity
factor, AH ; on the ow equation (governing the quantity of notional FDI)
and the selection equation (governing the decision whether to invest at all).
As before, suppose initially that the wage rate in the host country (wH)
is xed [that is, ignore the labor market clearing condition in equation (5.8)].
An increase in AH raises the quantity of new investment (K+), if the invest-
ment is at all carried out, the acquisition price (V + CH) that FDI investors
pay, the amount of notional FDI, and the demand for labor in the host coun-
try3. However, when wages are not xed [but are rather determined by the
labor-market clearing equation (5.8)], then the increase in the demand for
labor raises the wage rate (wH) in the host country (and the xed setup
cost wHLCH), thereby countering the above e¤ects on K
+; V + CH , and the
notional FDI. With a unique equilibrium, the initial e¤ects of the increase in
AH are likely to dominate the subsequent counter e¤ects of the rise in wH ,
so that the notional FDI still rises4. Thus, an increase in the host countrys
productivity factor (AH) raises the volume of the notional FDI ows from
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country S to country H that is governed by the ow equation.
Next, consider the e¤ect of a productivity shock on the selection equation.
A rise in AH increases the value of the domestic component of the setup
cost, wH(AH)LCH . This e¤ect by itself weakens the advantage of carrying out
positive FDI ows from country S to country H at all. In other words, the
gap between V +   CH and V   in the selection equation may narrow down.
To sum up, a positive productivity shock in the host country raises the
observed notional FDI ows in the ow equation and, at the same time, may
lower the likelihood of observing positive FDI ows at all.
We demonstrate the possibility of conicting e¤ects of an increase in the
host country productivity level (AH) on the ow and selection equations with
variable wage via some simulations. We employ a production function with
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and diminishing returns to scale:
F (K;L) = [K + (1  )L] 
where  = 0:95 (ensuring diminishing returns) and  =  0:05 (implying an
elasticity of substitution of 0.95).5 Figure 5.1a depicts the notional FDI ows
[FDIN in equation (5.10)] and the actual FDI ows [FDI in equation (5.9)]
as a function of the host country productivity level (AH). Figure 5.1b depicts
the left hand side of the selection condition (5.11) as a function of AH . As we
can see from Figure 5.1a, FDIN is indeed increasing in AH . However, Figure
5.1b shows that as AH increases the left-hand side of the selection condition
104CHAPTER 5. COUNTRY-SPECIFICAGGREGATE SHOCKS: REPRESENTATIVE FIRM
can drop below zero, thereby eliminating the actual FDI even though the
notional FDI still rises.
(Figure 5.1 A&B about here)
Next, consider the e¤ect of the productivity level in the source country
(AS) on the ow and selection equations. Clearly, AS does not appear in the
the ow equation (5.10), so that it does not a¤ect the ow of notional FDI.
Neither does AS a¤ect the selection equation in its current form of equation
(5.11). However, AS comes into play in the selection decision, when we
consider again the limited supply of entrepreneurs in the source country. This
consideration is particularly relevant for greeneld FDI. A source-country
representative entrepreneur then faces a discrete choice of whether to invest
either at home or abroad, but not in both. In this case, in order for her to
make greeneld FDI, it no longer su¢ ces that V +   CH exceeds V  ; rather
V + CH must also exceed the value of alternative direct investment at home.
The latter naturally depends positively on the source-country productivity
level, AS, and we denote it by B(AS): That is, the selection condition is:
V +[AH ; wH(AH)]  CH > Max

V  [AH ; K0H ; wH(AH)]; B(AS)
	
: (5.12)
Thus, the source-country productivity level a¤ects negatively the selection
decision. But it has no bearing on the ow decision.
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5.4 Conclusion
We analyze some determinants of FDI in the presence of setup costs, which
give rise to two channels of inuence on FDI. In particular, we studied the
role of the source and host country productivity levels. A host-country pos-
itive productivity shock raises the volume of notional FDI in the ow equa-
tion, but may lower the likelihood of selecting positive FDI ows at all. A
source-country productivity shock has a negative e¤ect on selecting positive
greeneld FDI, but has no bearing on their ows. This chapter provides an
analytical underpinning for the econometric investigation to follow.
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Notes
1For notational simplicity, we also set the number of rm (N) equal one.
2This cost may be a¤ected by input prices in other industries. Feliciano
and Lipsey (2000) nd that a foreign presence in manufacturing in the U.S.
raises wages in non-manufacturing establishments.
3The proofs of these claims follows in a straightforward manner from the
preceding chapter.
4However, with xed setup cost the equilibrium need not to be unique, and
an increase in AH may, somewhat counter-intuitively, reduce FDI, possibly
even to zero. For a similar phenomenon, see Razin, Sadka and Coury (2003).
5The other parameter values are  = 0:8, CSH = 0, L0H = 1, K
0
H = 0:01,
LCH = 0:15, r = 0:2:
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Chapter 6
Overview of the Econometric
Equations
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present some basic elements of the econometric approach
adopted in the empirical investigation of the theoretical implications of our
analysis of the bilateral FDI ows in the preceding part. Recall that a crucial
feature of the formation of FDI that we emphasized in the rst part is the
two-fold nature of FDI decisions. There is a decision to make concerning
the question whether to invent at all - captured by a "threshold" selection
equation; and concerning howmuch to invest - captured by the ow or gravity
equation.
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6.2 The Heckman Selection Model
The two-fold nature of FDI decision gives rise to many cases of zero actual
FDI ows. With n countries in a sample, there are potentially n(n-1) pairs
of source-host (s,h) countries. In fact, the actual number of (s,h) pairs with
observed ows is typically much smaller. Therefore, the selection of the ac-
tual number of (s,h) pairs, which is naturally endogenous, cannot be ignored;
that is, this selection cannot be taken as exogenous, as has been often a
standard practice in gravity models in the literature. This feature of FDI
decisions lends itself naturally to the application of the Heckman selection
model (1974, 1979).1 This selection-bias method is adopted to jointly esti-
mate the likelihood of surpassing a certain threshold (the selection equation)
and the magnitude of the FDI ow, provided that the threshold is indeed
surpassed (the ow equation).
Specify the ow equation [such as equation (5.10)] as
Yijt =
8><>: Y

ijt = Xijt + uijt if 

ijt = 0
0 if ijt < 0
; (6.1)
where Y ijt is a latent variable denoting the ow of notional FDI from source
country i to host country j in period t; Xijt is a vector of explanatory vari-
ables;  is a coe¢ cient vector; uijt is an error term; and Yijt is the actual ow
of FDI. Note that Y ijt can take both positive and negative values. Note also
that the actual ow of FDI, Yijt, is zero not only when the notional ow, Y ijt,
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is negative; Yijt may be zero even when Y ijt is positive, but does not provide
enough prot to surpass the threshold. ijt is the substance of the selection
equation [see, for instance, condition (5.11)], and is specied by
ijt  0ijt=0 = (Wijt   Cijt)=0 ; (6.2)
where ijt indicates whether an FDI would be made or not (depending
whether it is positive or negative); Wijt is a vector of explanatory variables
(which may overlap with the explanatory variables of Xijt); Cijt is the xed
cost of setting up new investment;  is a vector of coe¢ cients; and 0 is the
standard deviation of 0. The setup cost Cijt is given by
Cijt = Aijt + vijt; (6.3)
where Aijt is a vector of explanatory variables;  is a vector of coe¢ cients;
and vijt is an error term. Substituting for Cijt in equation (6.2) from equation
(6.3), we get:
ijt = Zijt + "ijt; (6.4)
where Zijt = (Wijt; Aijt);  = (=0 ; =0 ; ); and
"ijt =  vijt=0 : (6.5)
Assuming that uijt and vijt are normally distributed with zero means,
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it follows that "ijt  N(0; 1): The error terms, uijt and "ijt; are bivariate
normal:

uijt
"ijt

 N

0
0

;

2Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
1

: (6.6)
Dene the following indicator function:
Dijt =

1 if ijt = 0
0 otherwise
: (6.7)
The latter function indicates whether the threshold is surpassed and an FDI
ow is formed or not. Note that  itself is a latent variable which is not
observed. But we do observe D, that is we do observe whether  is positive
or not.
The expected value of Yijt, conditional on the event that there is indeed
a positive FDI ow, is given by
E (Yijt=Dijt = 1) = Xijt + E (uijt=Dijt = 1)  Xijt + ijt; (6.8)
where
 = Y Y  (6.9)
and
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ijt =
(Zijt)
(Zijt)
(6.10)
is the inverse Mills ratio;  and  are the density and cumulative unit-
normal distribution functions, respectively. Note again that we do not ob-
serve ijt, but we do observe Dijt. Because Prob(Dijt = 1) = Prob(

ijt =
0) = Pr ob("ijt =  Zijt) = Pr ob("ijt 5 Zijt), by equation (6.4) and the
symmetry of the normal distribution, it follows that
Prob(Dijt = 1) = (Zijt): (6.11)
The maximum likelihood method is then employed to jointly estimate the
ow coe¢ cient vector  and the selection coe¢ cient vector .
Note that ijt depends on Xijt. Therefore, one can see from equation
(6.8) that OLS estimates of the coe¢ cient vector  of the ow equation,
conned to positive observations of Yijt (that is, discarding the zero ows), is
biased because such estimates include also the e¤ect of Xijt on Yijt through
the term ijt. Figure 6.1 explains the intuition for the cause of the bias
for the case where Y  > 0. Suppose, for instance, that xijt measures the
productivity di¤erential between the ith source country and the potential
jth host country, holding all other variables constant. Our theory predicts
that the parameter x is positive. This is shown by the upward sloping line
AB. Note that the slope is an estimate of the "true" marginal e¤ect of xijt
on Y ijt: But recall that ows could also be equal to zero, if the setup costs
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are su¢ ciently high. A threshold, which is derived from the setup costs, is
shown as the curve TT 0 in Figure 6.1. However, if we discard observations
with zero actual FDI ows, the remaining sub-sample is no longer random.
As equation (6.2) makes clear, the selection of country pairs into the sub-
sample depends on the vectorXijt (including xijt): To illustrate, suppose that
for high values of xijt (say, xH in Figure 6.1), (i; j) pair-wise FDI ows are all
positive. That is, for all pairs of countries in the sub-sample the threshold is
surpassed and the observed average of notional FDI ows for xijt = xH is also
equal to the conditional population average for FDI ows, point R on line
AB. However, this does not hold for low values of xijt (say, xL). For these
(i; j)-pairs, we observe positive values of Yi;j;t only for a subset of country
pairs in the population. Point S is, for instance, excluded from the sub-
sample of positive FDI ows. Consequently, for low xijts, we observe only
ows between country pairs with low setup costs (namely, with low vi;j;ts).
As a result, the observed average of the FDI ows is at point M 0, whereas
the "true" average is at point M . As seen in Figure 6.1, the OLD regression
line for the sub-sample is therefore the A0B0 line, which underestimates the
e¤ect of productivity di¤erentials on bilateral FDI ows.
(Figure 6.1 about here)
If we do not discard the zero FDI ow observations, the OLS estimates of
 are still biased, because they are based on observations on Y rather than
on Y :2
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6.3 The Tobit Model
As we have seen, our theory suggests that actual FDI ows may be zero
even when notional FDI ows are not. In fact, the actual FDI ow variable
in a typical sample is zero for a signicant fraction of the sample, but is
roughly continuously distributed for positive values. In such circumstances,
the Tobit model is often employed. The jist of this model is in our case as
follows. Suppose that instead of equation (6.1) , we were to have:
Y 0ijt =
8><>: Y

ijt = Xijt + ijt if Y

ijt = 0
0 if Y ijt < 0
; (6.1a)
where ijt s N(0; 2Y ). Dene now an index function
D0ijt =

1 if Y ijt = 0
0 if Y ijt < 0
: (6.7a)
One can show [see, for instance, Woolridge (2003)] that in this case
E
 
Y 0ijt=D
0
ijt = 1

= Xijt + 
0

0
ijt; (6.8a)
where
0 = Y  (6.9a)
and
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0ijt =
(Xijt=Y )
(Xijt=Y )
(6.10a)
Comparing the Tobit equations (6.8a)-(6.10a) with the Heckman equa-
tions (6.8)-(6.10), one can see that the Tobit model is a special case of the
Heckman model when Y ijt and 

ijt are fully positively correlated, that is:
Y  = 1. In this special case, there is a perfect correlation between the
event Y ijt = 0 and the event ijt = 0 (for any given Xijt), and therefore
the two fundamental equations (6.1) and (6.1a) are the same. Thus, if the
estimated value of Y  in the Heckman model is signicantly below 1, then
the Tobit estimates of the coe¢ cient vector  are biased.
6.4 Conclusion
Historically, empirical studies of the ows FDI where cast in a framework
of gravity equations. However, xed setup costs create some thresholds for
FDI ows. The latter are therefore positive only when a certain protability
threshold is surpassed. Thus, a typical sample of FDI ows contains a mass
(a "big fraction") of zero entries. The empirical literature developed after
Tinbergen (1962) has either omitted pairs with no FDI ows, or treated
reported zero ows as literally indicating zero ows3 and employed Tobit
estimation methods.4 In this chapter we overviewed the Heckman Selection
and the Tobit methods and illustrated why the former is more appropriate
than either the latter or the OLS method in case there are xed setup
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costs. Unlike the Tobit and the OLS method, the Heckman method provides
unbiased estimates for the determinants of the ows of FDI; it also provides
unbiased estimates for the determinants of the endogenous selection of FDI
ows, which selection is ignored by both the Tobit and OLS methods.
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Notes
1See also Keane, Mo¢ t and Runkle (1986) and Kyhazidou (1996) for
applications to panel data.
2Recently, Silva and Tenreyro (2003) proposed the Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood estimator to deal with zero values in the bilateral trade models.
3Zero ows are sometime also treated as measurement errors. Note that
if measurement errors (in the dependent variable) are nor correlated with
the explanatory variables, then the estimated parameters are not biased;
although they are imprecisely estimated.
4Eaton and Tamura (1996) introduced the use of a threshold Tobit es-
timation to deal with zeros in trade or FDI bilateral ows. The potential
for zero FDI activity is also recognized by Brainard (1997) who studies the
method multinationals use to serve markets. In robustness checks she pro-
vides generalized Tobit estimates that include a probit for the probability of
any a¢ liate sales, combined with the OLS for the import share, where a¢ li-
ate sales are observed. Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) similarly employ
Tobit method to study the determinants of goods trade. As we show here,
these estimates may be biased, if there are indeed xed costs that generate
thresholds for positive ows of either FDI or goods trade.
Chapter 7
Application to a Base-Line
Sample: OLS, Tobit and the
Heckman Selection Model
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we employ data on bilateral FDI ows in a sample of 24
OECD countries over the period from 1981 to 1998 in order to illustrate
the application of the Heckman Selection, the Tobit and the OLS methods.
This application provides a benchmark empirical study of the determinants
of FDI. In the next part we extend this benchmark study to include some
major variables which constitute the focus of the theoretical investigation in
Part One.
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7.2 Data and Variables
Data are drawn from OECD reports (OECD, various years) on a sample of
24 OECD countries, over the period from 1981 to 1998. The FDI data are
based on the OECD reports of FDI exports from 17 OECD source countries
to 24 OECD countries.
In order to smooth the various variables over business cycles, we employ
3-year averages, so that we have six periods (each consisting of 3 years).
The main explanatory variables that we employ are: (1) standard country
characteristics such as GDP or GDP per-capita, population size, educational
attainment (as measured by average years of schooling), language, nancial
sound rating (the inverse of nancial risk rating), etc.; (2) (s; h) source-host
characteristics, such as geographical distance, common language (zero-one
variable), (s; h) ows of goods, bilateral telephone tra¢ c per-capita as a
proxy for informational distance, etc. Table 7.1 describes the list of the 24
countries in the sample, and indicates for each country whether positive ows
are observed in the sample, at least once, as a source or host country (but
most source countries do not interact more than with few host countries).
Table 7.2 summarizes the data sources.
(Table 7.1 about here)
(Table 7.2 about here)
7.3. ESTIMATION 121
7.3 Estimation
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 provide a "rst look" at the direction and volume
of FDI ows. The rst of these two tables describes the frequency of FDI
ows between all possible (s,h) pairs. It suggests that source-host di¤erences
in GDP per capita look as good predictors of the direction of ows. The
frequency of ows is close to one among rich countries, whereas it is very
low and often zero among poorer countries. Table 7.4 describes FDI ows as
percentages of the host-country GDP. It suggests that source-host di¤erences
in GDP per capita are not correlated with the volume of FDI ows for the
subset of country pairs with positive ows. For instance, Japan which is
the second richest country in the sample received FDI ows from the U.S.
amounting to 1.26 percent of Japans GDP; whereas Spain received FDI from
the U.S. amounting to 6.54% of Spains GDP.1
(Table 7.3 about here)
(Table 7.4 about here)
We now turn to the estimation of the determinants of bilateral FDI ows.
We consider several potential explanatory variables of the two-fold decisions
on FDI ows.2 We regroup these variables as follows: standard "mass" vari-
ables (the source and host population sizes); "distance" variables (physical
distance between the source and host countries and whether or not the two
122CHAPTER 7. APPLICATIONTOABASE-LINE SAMPLE: OLS, TOBITANDTHEHECKMAN SELECTIONMODEL
countries share a common language); and "economic" variables (source and
host GDP per capita, source-host di¤erences in average years of schooling,
and source and host nancial risk rating). We also control for country and
time xed e¤ects. The dependent variable in all the ow (gravity) equations
is the log of the FDI ow, deated by the unit value of manufactured goods
exports.
We employ three alternative econometric procedures. As a benchmark, we
ignore the selection equation, and simply estimate the gravity equation twice:
(i) by treating all FDI ows in (s; h) pairs with no recorded FDI ows as
zeros(OLS-zero);3 (ii) by excluding country pairs with no FDI ows (OLS-
D). The rationale for inserting zeros in the OLS-zero case is as follows.
Generally, when one observes zero FDI ows between a pair of countries, it
could be either because the two countries do not wish to have such ows,
even in the absence of xed costs, or because setup costs are prohibitive, or
because of measurement errors. But if one assumes that there are no setup
costs or measurement errors, (s; h) pairs with zero FDI ows truly indicate
zero ows. This is why we assign a negligible value as a common low value for
the value of the FDI ows for the zero-ows (s; h) pairs.4 (All other positive
ows have logarithmic value much exceeding zero.) The estimation results
for the OLS-zero and OLS-D cases are shown in panel A of Table 7.5.
(Table 7.5 about here)
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Next, we continue to assume that there are no xed costs and that all
FDI ows that are below a certain low threshold level ("censor") are due to
measurement errors, and employ a Tobit estimator.5 We present the results
in Panel B of Table 7.5, with three censor levels (lowest, 0.0 and 3.00).
Against these two benchmarks, the role played by the unobserved xed
setup costs can be now brought to the limelight, when we employ the Heck-
man selection method. We jointly estimate the maximum likelihood of the
ow (gravity) equation and the selection equation. The Heckman estimation
method accommodates both measurement errors and a possible existence of
setup costs. Consider a binary variable Di;j;t which is equal to 1 if country i
exports positive FDI ows to country j at time t; zero otherwise. Assuming
that setup costs are lower if country i already invested in country j in the
past, then Di;j;t k could serve as an instrument in the selection equation (the
exclusion restriction). The results are described in Panel C of Table 7.5.
All estimations conform to the notion that the volume of FDI ows is not
a¤ected by deviations from long-run averages of GDP per capita in the source
and host countries. The coe¢ cient of the GDP per capita variable is not sig-
nicant in the Heckman selection equation. Turn to the e¤ect of the host
country education level, relative to the source country counterpart. Employ-
ing Tobit estimation, one may conclude that cross-country educational gaps
have a signicant e¤ect on the ow of FDI. However, the Heckman method
suggests that the cross-country educational gap manifests itself through the
selection and has no signicant e¤ect on the ow of FDI. To test whether the
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e¤ect on FDI ows is non-linear, we estimate the parameters of interest in the
OLS method for di¤erent ranges of FDI ows. That is, the OLS regression
in the OLS-zero case has di¤erent coe¢ cients than the OLS-D regression.
As expected, the common language dummy is positive and signicant,
and the distance coe¢ cient is negative and signicant in all formulations.
It is worth noting that only the Heckman model assigns a signicant posi-
tive role to the host country population (through the selection mechanism).
The coe¢ cient of the host-country nancial sound rating is signicant (and
positive) only in Heckman ow equation and the OLS-D case. The source-
country nancial sound rating has a negative and signicant e¤ect on FDI in
the Tobit cases and one of the two OLS cases (OLS-zero). However, the Heck-
man method suggests that this variable works through the selection process
rather than having a direct e¤ect on FDI ows. The existence of previous
ows of FDI has a signicant and positive e¤ect in the selection equation.
This may be interpreted as indicating that the existence of FDI ows in the
past reduces the xed cost of setting a new FDI.
Most importantly as a "smoking gun" for the existence of xed costs in
the data, we note that the correlation between the error terms in the ow and
the selection equations is negative and signicant. This nding, on which we
further elaborate in the next section, provides an additional evidence for the
relevance of xed set up costs.
We have a few cases of negative ows in our sample. Negative ows
indicate liquidations of previous FDI. In Table 7.6 we use a dummy variable
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for negative FDI ows(that is, past FDI liquidations) as instruments. It is a
reasonable instrument because past FDI liquidations are correlated positively
with past FDI ows (liquidations, by denition, are generated from existing
stocks), but not apriori correlated with current FDI ows.
(Table 7.6 about here)
The Tobit estimation assigns a positive role (and occasionally signicant)
to this dummy concerning the ow of FDI. However, the Heckman estimation
suggests that the positive e¤ect comes through the selection mechanism.
The inclusion of this dummy variable did not signicantly a¤ects the results
reported in Table 7.5
7.4 Evidence for Fixed Costs
The nding that there is a signicant correlation () between the error terms
in the ow and selection equations indicates that the formation of an (s; h)
pair of positive FDI, and the size of the FDI ows between this pair of
countries are not independent processes. Furthermore, with  being nega-
tive, this correlation is consistent with the setup costs hypothesis6. If some
shocks jointly drive marginal productivity of capital and setup costs of FDI,
then indeed the error terms in the selection equation may be negatively corre-
lated with the errors terms in the ow equation. For instance, above-average
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marginal productivity of capital in a host country may yield below-average
likelihood of non-zero exports of FDI (because it may yield above-average
setup costs); as in Chapter Five.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we illustrate the application of OLS, Tobit and Heckman
estimation methods in a sample of bilateral FDI ows among 24 OECD
countries over a period ranging from 1981 to 1998. We provide some evidence
for the existence of xed setup costs. In such a case the OLS and Tobit
estimates of the determinants of FDI ows are biased. Furthermore, the
Heckman method suggests that some of the factors, that are found to be
determinants of FDI ows in the OLS and Tobit estimation, in fact inuence
FDI through the selection mechanism rather than directly through the ows
of FDI.
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Notes
1Note that we aggregate FDI data over 3 years.
2As we do not naturally pretend to provide a general theory which explains
all potential determinants of FDI ows, we include some other explanatory
variables that are found relevant elsewhere in the literature.
3More precisely, the log of the FDI ow is set equal to log of the lowest
observed ow between any (s; h) country pair in the sample.
4We choose this value to be the lowest observed ow between any (s; h)
country pair in the sample.
5Note that this estimator is appropriate also in the case where the desired
FDI ows were actually negative, as in the case where a foreign subsidiary is
liquidated, but were recorded as zeros.
6For some micro-level evidence for the existence of xed costs see Ca-
ballero and Engel (1999 and 2000).
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Chapter 8
Productivity Shocks
8.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment has become a key channel of international capital
ows. In Chapter Five we explain that cross country productivity di¤erences
can generate FDI ows. In particular, country-specic productivity shocks
within a source-host country pair a¤ect FDI in a variety of possibly conicting
ways. A positive productivity shock in the source country is expected to have
a negative e¤ect the selection equation. A positive productivity shock in the
host country may also have somewhat surprisingly a negative e¤ect in the
selection equation, but a positive e¤ect on the ows of FDI.
The two-fold (selection and ow) FDI decision is generated by the ex-
istence of "lumpy" setup costs of new investments that govern the ow of
bilateral FDI. The rich and technologically-advanced countries have a com-
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parative advantage in setting up foreign subsidiaries. As this advantage may
also be industry-specic, the model is capable of generating two-way rich-
rich, and rich-poor FDI ows.
Threshold barriers play also an important role in determining the ex-
tent of trade-based foreign direct investment; see, for instance, Zhang and
Markusen (1999), Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), and Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple (2004). The trade-based literature typically focuses on issues such
as the interdependence of FDI and trade in goods and the ensuing industrial
structure. For instance, they attempt to explain how a source country can
export both FDI and goods to the same host country. The explanation es-
sentially rests on productivity heterogeneity within the source country, and
di¤erences in setup costs associated with FDI and export of goods. The
trade-based literature on FDI is based on a framework of heterogenous rms,
such as in Melitz (2003). Thus, the empirical approach in this literature is
geared towards a rm-level decisions on exports and FDI in the source coun-
try. As explained in Chapter Five, the analytical framework, which leads to
the empirical investigation of this chapter, is based on a representative-rm
model, as mostly common in macro studies. Our focus is therefore on ag-
gregate bilateral FDI. Thus, trade-based empirical applications typically use
micro-dataset, whereas we utilize country-wide data set. Note that micro
cross-country panel datasets are not available, so that micro-based empirical
studies have to be conned typically to a single source or host country and to
extremely short time span. In contrast, we employ here data for 62 OECD
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and non-OECD countries over a large interval of time (1987-2000).
8.2 Data
We consider several potential explanatory variables of the two-fold decisions
on FDI ows. As before, these variables include standard "mass" variables
(the source and host population sizes); "distance" variables (physical distance
between the source and the host countries and whether or not the two coun-
tries share a common language); and "economic" variables (source and host
real GDP per capita, source-host di¤erences in average years of schooling,
and source and host nancial risk rating). We also control for country and
time xed e¤ects. The dependent variable in all the ow (gravity) equations
is the log of the FDI ows.
As before, the main variables are grouped as follows: (1) standard coun-
try characteristics such as real GDP per-capita, population size, educational
attainment (as measured by average years of schooling), and nancial sound
rating (the inverse of nancial risk taking); (2) (s,h) source-host charac-
teristics, such as (s,h) FDI ows, geographical distance, common language
(zero-one variable). In addition, we focus on a new explanatory variable: (3)
productivity, approximated by labor productivity, that is output per worker,
as measured by PPP-adjusted real GDP per worker. This variable is at
times instrumented by the capital/labor ratio. Table 8.1 summarizes the
data sources. Table 8.2 describes the list of the 62 countries in the sam-
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ple, and indicates for each country, as a source or a host, whether positive
bilateral ows are observed in the sample, at least once. Note that most
source countries do not interact more than with few host countries. Here we
do not smooth the data by taking three-year averages, as in Chapter Seven,
but rather employ unltered annual data. This enables us to investigate the
e¤ects of the explanatory variables over the business cycle.
(Tables 8.1 and 8.2 about here)
Data on FDI ows are drawn from the International Direct Investment
dataset (Source OECD), covering the bilateral FDI ows among 62 countries
(29 OECD countries and 33 Non-OECD countries) over the period 1987 to
2000. The Source OECD provides data on FDI ows in U.S. dollars, and we
deate them by the U.S. CPI for urban consumers.
8.3 Empirical Evidence
As we explained in Part One, the existence of xed setup costs generates
many observations with zero FDI ows. In our dataset, there are indeed
about 62% host-source pairs for which no FDI ows appear. Therefore, as
explained in Part Two, the Heckman selection method is adopted to jointly
estimate the likelihood of surpassing a threshold generated by the latent
xed setup costs (the selection equation) and the magnitude of the FDI
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ows, provided that the threshold is indeed surpassed (the ow or gravity
equation).
The Source OECD dataset reports FDI ows from OECD countries to
OECD and non-OECD countries, as well as FDI ows from non-OECD
countries to OECD countries. However, it does not report FDI ows from
non-OECD to non-OECD countries. We therefore estimate the model under
several alternative assumptions concerning the missing observations on FDI
ows from non-OECD to non-OECD countries. Most likely, these missing
observations reect zero FDI ows and this is how we treat them on one alter-
native. In another alternative, we discard the observations with the missing
data on the FDI ows (from non-OECD countries to non-OECD countries).
In addition, we present the estimation with and without instrumenting the
potentially endogenous output per worker variable, by the capital/labor ra-
tio and years of schooling variables. The estimation results are presented in
Tables 8.3-8.4. In each table, Panel A presents the results when the produc-
tivity factor is approximated by the output per worker variable. In Panel
B, the latter is replaced by instrumental variables: the capital/labor ratio
and the years of schooling variables. Table 8.5 presents the results of the
estimation of the instrumental equation.
(Table 8.3 about here)
Table 8.3 presents the estimation of the equations for bilateral FDI ow
and selection (ignoring missing observations on FDI ows from non-OECD
136 CHAPTER 8. PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS
to non-OECD). The e¤ect of the education variable, namely the source-host
di¤erence in education levels, on the selection mechanism is signicant and
negative, but not so on the magnitude of the ows, across di¤erent alternative
versions of the productivity variable. Host-country nancial sound rating
is important in most of the specications in this table, both in the ow
and in the selection equations. But we nd no evidence for the importance
of the source nancial sound ratings on bilateral FDI ows, neither in the
ow nor in the selection margins. Host GDP per capita is important in
the ow equation only. As expected, and consistent with previous "gravity"
literature, we nd that common language raises, and distance reduces the
volume of FDI ows. These two explanatory variables have similar e¤ects
in the selection equation. Host population size has a signicant coe¢ cient
in the ow equation but not in the selection equation. Source population
size is insignicant in either equation. The e¤ect of the existence of past FDI
relations is positive and signicant in the selection equation, as it may help to
reduce the setup costs of establishing a new FDI ow, which is in line with our
theoretical predictions. We also note that the correlation between the error
terms in the ow and the selection equations is negative and signicant at
the 5%-level. As explained in Chapter Seven, this result may be interpreted
as an evidence for the existence of xed costs, because in their absence the
correlation coe¢ cient is one (and the Heckman model reduces to the Tobit
model). The past FDI dummy is used as am exclusion restriction variable.
The positive coe¢ cient is interpreted as an indication for a lower threshold
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barrier for pairs of countries that had positive FDI ows in the past.
We turn now to the variables at the focus of the investigation: the pro-
ductivity factor, as approximated by output per worker. In Panel A the
host output per worker has a positive and signicant e¤ect in the ow and
selection equations. Source-country output per worker has a negative and
signicant e¤ect only on the selection mechanism, but has no signicant ef-
fect on the ows of FDI. These results about the e¤ects of the source-country
productivity shocks on the ow and selection equations are consistent with
the analytical framework developed in Chapter Five. In Panel B, with the
productivity variable instrumented by capital per worker and education at-
tainment, the host output per worker a¤ects negatively and signicantly the
selection mechanism, which is consistent with the model of Chapter Five, but
is insignicant in the ow equation (unlike what is predicted by our model).
The source instrumented output per worker negatively a¤ects both the ow
of FDI and the selection mechanism.
(Table 8.4 about here)
In Table 8.4 we present the estimation of the ow and selection equations,
when we treat missing observations on FDI ows from non-OECD to non-
OECD countries as "zeros". Results are broadly similar to Table 8.3 and
provide evidence consistent with the key hypotheses about the conicting
e¤ects of productivity shocks.
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(Table 8.5 about here)
Note that the relationship in the selection equation between the prob-
ability (P ) of making a new FDI and the explanatory variables (including
productivity) is described by the following (non-linear) equation:
P (prodH) =
+P prodHZ
 1
(2) 1=2 exp( y2=2)dy; (8.1)
where  represents the e¤ect of all the other explanatory variables (held
xed at their sample averages), including country and time xed e¤ects, and
P is the coe¢ cient of prodH (output per worker in the host country) in
the selection equation. Note also that the estimate of P is negative and
statistically signicant. The marginal e¤ect of prodH on P is
@P=@prodH = P (2)
 1=2 exp[ (+ PprodH)2=2] < 0:1 (8.2)
Moreover, the expected value of FDI ow is
E [FDI] = P (prodH) exp( + PprodH) + [1  P (prodH)]  0; (8.3)
where  represents the e¤ect of all the other explanatory variables (held
xed at their sample averages), and P is the coe¢ cient of prodH in the ow
equation. Note that we use exp( + PprodH) for the observed FDI ow in
that our dependent variable in the ow equation is the log of FDI. Therefore,
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the marginal e¤ect of prodH on expected bilateral FDI ows, normalized by
exp( + PprodH)P (prodH), is:
1
exp( + PprodH)P (prodH)
dE [FDI]
dprodH
=
dP (prodH)
P (prodH)dprodH
+ P : (8.4)
The rst component, dP (prodH)
P (prodH)dprodH
, is negative, while the second compo-
nent, P , is positive (see Panel A in Table 8.3). The net e¤ect depends on
which component is the dominant force. Figure 8.1 depicts this normalized
marginal e¤ect for the U.S. as a source country, with all variables except
prodH xed at their sample average (based on Panel A in Table 8.3). Figure
8.1 clearly shows that as productivity increases, its marginal impact decreases
nonlinearly. Expected FDI ows decline in the level of host country produc-
tivity2. That is, holding constant US productivity as a source country, the
e¤ect of an increase in the host country productivity depends crucially on
the initial value of the productivity parameter.
(Figure 8.1 about here)
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we take to the data the prediction of our theory (Chapter
Five) about the conicting e¤ects of productivity changes on FDI ows. A
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positive productivity shock in the host country typically increases the volume
of the desired FDI ows to the host country, through the standard marginal
protability e¤ect (the ow equation). But, at the same time, the same shock
may lower the likelihood of making any new FDI ows by the source country
(the selection equation), through a total protability e¤ect, derived from
the a general-equilibrium increase in wages and other input prices. Using a
sample of 62 OECD and Non-OECD countries, over the period 1987-2000, we
provide supporting evidence for the existence of such e¤ects of productivity
shocks on bilateral FDI. That is, the empirical ndings is that productivity
would a¤ect the aggregate ows of FDI in one way and the likelihood of
positive FDI ows in another.
Finally, we mention a potential caveat. The predictions from the model
with xed costs are predictions related to investment in capacity, but the
FDI ow data captures nancial ows associated with such investment. A
fraction of FDI investment is often nanced in an a¢ liates host country,
coming from host country sources. To the extent that this fraction is not
correlated with the productivity shocks, the empirical predictions though
are not biased.
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Notes
1To complete the picture, note also that P (prodH) has an inection point
at prod =  =P :
2In our data sample, output per worker in host countries ranges from 2.45
to 86.6.
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Chapter 9
Source and Host Corporate Tax
Rates
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter we focus the empirical analysis of the determinants of bilat-
eral FDI ows on the e¤ects of taxation. In the era of increased globalization,
cross-country di¤erences in taxation may play a major role in the interna-
tional allocation of investment:
"European countries have been steadily slashing corporate-tax
rates as they vie for foreign investment, potentially adding to
pressure on the U.S. for similar cuts as it weighs a tax overhaul.
Following the lead of Ireland, which dropped its rates to 12.5%
from 24% between 2000 and 2003, one nation after another has
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moved toward atter, lower corporate rates with fewer loopholes"
(Wall Street Journal Europe, January 28-30, 2005).
More recently, Turkey has also jumped on the band of wagon of slushing
tax rates in order to attract foreign direct investment:
"Turkey is to slash corporate and personal tax rates in an e¤ort to
attract foreign direct investment. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prime
minister, said yesterday the standard rate of corporate tax would
be cut from 30 per cent to 20 per cent to allow Turkey to compete
for investment against the new European Union member states.
The overall tax burden for all companies would fall to 28 per
cent from 37 per cent, while the top rate of personal income tax
would fall to 35 per cent. These cuts will attract investment from
abroad and greatly increase our competitiveness with neighbor-
ing countries and with the European Union." (Financial Times,
November 30, 2005).
Indeed, the economic literature has extensively dealt with the e¤ects of
taxation on investment, going back to the well-known works of Harbeger
(1962) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Of particular interest are the ef-
fects of international di¤erences in tax rates on foreign direct investment;
see, for instance, Auerbach and Hassett (1993), Hines (1999), Desai and
Hines (2001), De Mooij and Ederveen (2001), and Devereux and Hubbard
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(2003). In Appendix 9A.1 we provide a brief discussion of basic principles of
international taxation of capital income.
In this chapter we attempt to provide a new look at the mechanisms
through which corporate tax rates inuence aggregate FDI ows, in the setup
adopted in this book of two-fold investment decisions in the presence of
threshold barriers. In this context, the source and host tax rates may have
di¤erent e¤ects on these two decisions. (the ow and selection equations).
9.2 Source and Host Taxation
Consider for concreteness the case of a parent rm that weighs the devel-
opment of a new product line. We can think of the xed setup cost as the
outlays of developing the product line. The rm may choose to make the
development at home and then carry the production at a subsidiary abroad.
This choice may be determined by some "genuine" economic considerations
such as source-host di¤erences in labor costs, in infrastructure, in human
capital, etc. But it may also be inuenced by tax considerations.
In this context of FDI, there arises the issue of double taxation. The in-
come of a foreign a¢ liate is typically taxed by the host country. If the source
country taxes this income too, then the combined (double) tax rate may be
very high, and even exceeds 100%1. This double taxation is typically relieved
at the source country by either exempting foreign-source income altogether
or granting tax credits2. In the former case, foreign-source income is subject
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to the tax levied by the host country only. When the source country taxes its
resident on their world-wide income and grants full credit for foreign taxes
(residence taxation), then in principle the foreign-source income is taxed at
the source-country tax rate, so that the host-country tax rate becomes ir-
relevant for investment decisions in the source country. But, in practice,
foreign-source income is far from being taxed at the source country rate.
First, there are various reduced tax rates for foreign-source income. Second,
foreign-source income is usually taxed only upon repatriation, thereby ef-
fectively reducing the present value of the tax. Thus, in practice, the host
country tax-rate is much relevant for investment decisions of the parent rm
at the source country. The relevance of the host-country tax rate intensies
through transfer pricing.3
To highlight the issue of source-host di¤erences in tax rates, suppose that
the source country does not tax foreign-source income at all. Denote the
xed cost of development by C. Now, if the host-country tax rate is lower
than that of the source country, then the parent rm at the source country
attempts to keep this cost at home for tax purposes. The rm may thus
charge its subsidiary articially low royalties for the right to produce the
new product. Thus, this cost remains largely deductible in the high-tax
source country.4 As before, denote the (maximized) present value of the cash
ows arising from the production and sale of the new product by V (H) C;
it depends (negatively) on the corporate tax rate (H) levied by the host
country.
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To see this note rst that one of the channels through which corporate
taxation distorts investment decisions is the depreciation allowed for tax
purposes. Denote the true rate of depreciation by  and the rate allowed for
tax purposes by `. In this case V (H) is given by
V (H) = max
(K;L)

[AHF (K;L)  wHL](1  H) + H`K + (1  )K
1 + (1  H)r   (K  K
0
H)

;
(9.1)
where, as before, K demotes the post-investment capital stock, K0H is the
existing (post-depreciation) stock of capital, L is the labor input, wH is the
host-country wage rate, and r is the world rate of interest. Note that in
the presence of taxation, the discount rate is the after-tax rate  (1  H)r.
(This specication assumes that the subsidiary uses debt in the host country
to nance the new investment.) Employing the envelope theorem, it follows
from equation (9.1) that @V=@H < 0: That is, the present value of the
subsidiarys cash ow falls when the corporate-tax rate in the host country
rises, as is indeed expected. Furthermore, the amount of new investment
(the ow of FDI) depends negatively on H . The rst order condition for the
stock of capital becomes now
AHFK(K;L) = r +
   0H
1  H : (9.2)
This latter equation denes (implicitly) an equation for the ow of FDI. As
0 is typically smaller than , it follows that @K=@H < 0:5
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The parent rm will indulge into the project if
C(1  S)  V (H); (9.3)
where S is the corporate tax rate in the source country. The latter equation
denes a selection mechanism generated by a threshold barrier.
To sum up: as is evident from condition (9.3), the tax rate in the source
country, S, a¤ects positively the decision by a parent rm in country S
whether to carry out a foreign direct investment in country H; whereas the
tax rate in the host country, H ; has a negative e¤ect on this decision. The
tax rate in the source country, S, is irrelevant for the determination of the
magnitude of FDI ows; the latter are negatively a¤ected by H :
9.3 Empirical Evidence
As in the preceding chapters, the Heckman selection-bias method is adopted
to jointly estimate the likelihood of surpassing a threshold (the selection
equation) and the magnitude of the FDI ows, provided that the threshold
is indeed surpassed (the ow or gravity equation). The empirical study is
conned to 24 OECD countries over the period from 1981 to 1998, as in
Chapter Seven. The data source is also described in the latter chapter. We
naturally add the host and source corporate-tax rates to the list of explana-
tory variables.6,7
Table 9.1 presents the e¤ects of several potential explanatory variables of
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the two-fold decisions on FDI ows. Our focus is on the role of the source
and host corporate-tax rates, as all other variables were discussed in the
preceding chapters.
(Table 9.1 about here)
As explained in detail in Chapter Six, the OLS estimates of the e¤ects
of these variables are biased. This is true for both the OLS-D regression,
where the observations with no FDI ows are discarded (leaving only 851
observations out of the 2116 observations in the full sample); and for the OLS-
Zero regressions, where the no-ow observations were recorded as having FDI
ows of zero8. Note that the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients between OLS-D
and OLS-Zero indicate that there exist non linear relationships between the
dependent variable and the independent variables. The Heckman method
is suitable for estimating such non linear relationships, as discussed also
in Chapter Seven. The Heckman joint estimation of the ow and selection
equations are presented in the last two columns. We exclude certain variables
from the ow equation for identication. These are the source nancial
sound rating variable and the previous FDI dummy variable (one for the
existence of previous FDI). The existence of previous FDI may play a role in
reducing the xed costs assiciated with new FDI, but is not expected to a¤ect
the current ows of FDI. This is why we put this variable in the selection
equation but not in the ow equation. Similarly to what is explained in
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Chapter Five with respect to the source-country productivity factor in the
case of greeneld FDI, the source-country nancial sound rating may play a
role in the selection mechanism, but not in the ow equation. The results
concerning the non-tax variables are more or less in line with the ndings in
Chapters Seven and Eight.
For instance, a high gap in education in favor of the source country re-
duces the probability of having FDI ows to the host country. This is ex-
pected because a gap in years of schooling may be a proxy for a productivity
gap; see also Chapter Five. The host nancial sound rating a¤ects posi-
tively the ow of FDI, whereas the analogous variable of the source country
(an exclusion restriction variable) is negative and signicant in the selection
equation. Finally, the existence of past FDI relations (another exclusion re-
striction variable) is positive and signicant in the selection equation, as it
may help to reduce the setup costs of establishing a new FDI ow.
We turn now to the main focus of this chapter - the e¤ect of corporate-tax
rates. First, the source corporate-tax rate is positive and signicant in the
selection equation, as indeed predicted by condition (9.3). This rate plays
no statistically signicant role in the ow equation, again in line with our
analysis. The coe¢ cient of the host corporate-tax rate is insignicant in the
selection equation. But it is negative and signicant in the ow equation,
again as predicted by our analysis. Note that it is not merely the source-host
tax di¤erential (S   H) which is the main determinant of FDI ows.
Interestingly, the role of the source and host corporate-tax rates is not
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properly revealed by the traditional OLS regressions. In the rst regression
(OLS-D), only the host corporate-tax rate plays a statistically signicant role
in reducing FDI ows to the host country; whereas in the other regression
(OLS-Zero), it is only the source corporate-tax rate which plays a statistically
signicant role in promoting FDI ows from the source country9. Thus,OLS
analysis does not detect a role for both tax rate stop lay in the
determination of FDI.
As in the preceding chapter, we note that the relationship in the selec-
tion equation between the probability (P ) of making a new FDI and the
explanatory variables (including S) is not linear. It is rather given by
P (S) =
+SZ
 1
(2) 1=2 exp( y2=2)dy; (9.4)
where  represents the e¤ect of all the other explanatory variables (held
xed at their sample averages), including country xed e¤ects, and  is the
coe¢ cient of S in the selection equation. Note also that the estimate of 
is positive and statistically signicant. The marginal e¤ect of S on P is
@P=@S =  (2)
 1=2 exp[ (+ S)2=2] > 0: (9.5)
(Figure 9.1 about here)
Figure 9.1 depicts the graph of the function P (S) for the U.S. as a source
country and four EU countries (Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and the
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U.K.) as host countries. The U.S.-U.K. characteristics in the sample are such
that the estimated probability of a positive FDI ow from the U.S. to the
U.K. is one, una¤ected by the source country (namely, U.S.) tax rate. For
all other three countries, the U.S. tax rate has a strong positive e¤ect in
the relevant range of 0-40%. But the marginal e¤ect of the source-country
tax rate is not the same for all three countries, being highest for Greece.
Figure 9.2 depicts the ow equation for the U.S., as a source country, and
the four EU countries as host countries. The host-country tax rate seems to
have a negative e¤ect at all rates, including the very high rates that approach
100%. Notably, the tax rate of the U.K. (as a host country) has a very strong
negative marginal e¤ect, whereas the tax rate of Greece has a relatively small
marginal e¤ect.
(Figure 9.2 about here)
9.4 Conclusion
We analyze in this chapter the e¤ects of taxes on bilateral FDI ows. Evi-
dently, economists and policymakers reckon with the fact that taxes do a¤ect
economic activity. Bilateral FDI ows are no exception. Our aim is to bring
out the special mechanisms through which taxes inuence FDI, when invest-
ment decisions are likely to be two-fold because of the existence of xed setup
costs of new investments. As explained throughout this book, for each pair of
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source-host countries, there is a set of factors determining whether aggregate
FDI ows will occur, and a di¤erent set of factors determining the volume
of FDI ows, given that they occur at all. We demonstrate in this chapter
that the notion that the mere international tax di¤erentials are the main
factors behind the direction and magnitude of FDI ows is too simple. We
hypothesize that the source-country tax rate works primarily on the selection
process, whereas the host-country tax rate a¤ects mainly the magnitude of
the FDI, once they occur.
Analyzing an international panel data of 24 OECD countries, we bring
empirical evidence, using selection bias methods, in support of the predictions
of our theoretical conception. Our ndings have some bearing on the issue
of race to the bottom in the discussion of international tax competition.10
We nd that the e¤ects on bilateral FDI ows of a tax cut in the source
country is quantitatively di¤erent than a tax cut in the host country. This
means that there could be more intense race-to-the-bottom tax cuts among
predominantly host countries compared to source countries.
Appendix 9A: Basic Principles of International
Taxation of Capital Income
Two common principles of international taxation that are the foundations of
many national tax systems are the residence principle and source principle.
The residence principle employs the place of residency of the taxpayer as the
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basis for assessment of tax liabilities, whereas the source principle emphasizes
the source of income as the basis for assessing tax liabilities. According to
the residence principle, residents of a country are taxed uniformly on their
worldwide incomes, regardless of the source of that income (domestic or for-
eign). Similarly, nonresidents are not taxed by the home country on their
income originating in that country. According to the source principle, in-
comes originating in a country is uniformly taxed, regardless of the residency
of the income recipient. In addition, residents of a country are not taxed by
it on their foreign-source incomes.
In practice, countries adopt mixtures of these two pure (polar) principles
of international taxation. For instance, a country may tax its residents on
their world-wide income and, at the same time, tax also non-residents on the
income that originates in their country.
Consider a standard two-country world (home and foreign) and denote the
interest rates in the home and the foreign countries by r and r, respectively.
In general, the home country may have three di¤erent e¤ective tax rates that
apply to interest income:
D - tax rate levied on residents on their domestic-source income.
F - e¤ective tax rate levied on residents on their foreign-source income,
in addition to the tax already levied in the foreign country.
ND - tax rate levied on nonresidents on their interest income originating
in the home country.
Correspondingly, the foreign country may also have three tax rates, which
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we denote by  D; 

F ; 

ND. With complete integration of capital markets be-
tween the two countries (including the possibility of borrowing in one country
in order to invest in the other country), arbitrage possibilities imply that
r(1  D) = r(1   ND   F ); (9A.1)
and
r(1  ND    F ) = r(1   D): (9A.2)
Equation (9A.1) applies to the residents of the home country. It implies that
in equilibrium these residents are indi¤erent between investing at home or
abroad. If this equity was violated, then the home-country residents could
borrow unlimited amounts in the low (net of tax) interest rate country and
invest these borrowed funds in the high (net of tax) interest rate country,
thereby generating unlimited prots. Similarly, equation (9A.2), which ap-
plies to residents of the foreign country, rules out such unlimited prot op-
portunities to foreign residents.
The two polar international tax principles have di¤erent e¢ ciency impli-
cations. In a world with international capital mobility the equality between
saving and investment need not hold for each country separately but rather
for world aggregate saving and investment. This separation raises the issue
of the e¢ ciency of the international allocation of the world investments and
savings. A detailed analysis is provided in Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991).
156 CHAPTER 9. SOURCE AND HOST CORPORATE TAX RATES
Here we provide only a very concise treatment.
If the two countries adopt the residence principle, then
D = 

ND + F ; (9A.3)
 D = ND + 

F ; (9A.4)
and
ND = 

ND = 0: (9A.5)
Equation (9A.3) states that a resident of the home country is levied
e¤ectively the same tax rate whether she invests at home (D) or abroad
( ND + F ). Equation (9A.4) states the same thing for a resident of the for-
eign country. Equation (9A.5) states that there is indeed no source taxation
levied by any country on nonresidents. Substituting equation (9A.3) into
equation (9A.1) [or equation (9A.4) into equation (9A.2)] yields the (before-
tax) rate of return equalization between countries: r = r. That is, the
international allocation of the world stock of capital is e¢ cient. However, if
the tax rates are not the same in all countries, then the net returns accruing
to savers in di¤erent countries vary [that is, (1  D)r 6= (1   D)r], and the
international allocation of world savings is distorted.
On the other hand, if both countries adopt the source principle, then:
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D = ND; (9A.4)
 D = 

ND; (9A.5)
and
F = 

F = 0: (9A.6)
Substituting equations (9A.4)-(9A.6) into equations (9A.1)-(9A.2) yields
the (net of tax) rate-of-return equalization between residents of di¤erent
countries: r(1   D) = r(1    D): That is, the international allocation of
world savings is e¢ cient. However, if the tax rates are not the same in all
countries (that is, D 6=  D), then r 6= r, and the international allocation of
the world stock of capital is not e¢ cient.
It is worth mentioning that the public economics literature emphasizes
the superiority of the e¢ ciency in the international allocation of the world
stock of capital over the e¢ ciency of the international allocation of the world
savings when taxes are optimally designed11.
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Notes
1For a succinct review of this issue see, for example, Hines (2001).
2This is also the recommendation of the OECD model tax treaty (OECD,
1997). A similar recommendation is made also by the United Nations model
tax treaty (U.N. 1980).
3The recent Jobs Creation Act in the U.S. (2005) allows U.S. companies
to pay merely a tax of 5.25% on their foreign-source income.
4Of course, there still may be other elements of xed (setup) cost incurred
in the host country, as in Chapter Five. To highlight the di¤erential roles of
host and source tax rates we abstract here from these elements.
5In an oligopolistic competition environment, the e¤ects of H on invest-
ments may be opposite to the e¤ects we nd in our perfect competition
environment; see, for instance, Devereux and Hubbard (2003).
6We simply apply the statutory rates, because they are exogenously given.
Average e¤ective tax rates, suggested by Deverux and Gri¢ th (2003) as de-
terminants of the location of investments, are endogenous in the sense that
they are determined by the amount of investment. To apply econometri-
cally average e¤ective tax rates, there is a need for a good instrument. The
statutory rate is the best available instrument.
7The data source for these rates is: World Tax Database (University of
Michigan) http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/worldtaxdatabase.htm
8More accurately, as we measured FDI by logs, we put a large negative
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number for these FDI ows.
9We performed also several robustness tests. For instance, we excluded the
host and source nancial risk ratings from the ow equation. We also deleted
the variable "previous FDI" from both equations. The results concerning
the corporate-tax rates seem quite robust.
10For an overview of the traditional analysis of international taxation see,
for instance, Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991), Wilson (1999), and Hauer
(2001).
11This is as implication of work of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). For
details see, for instance, Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991).
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Policy in a Globalized Economy
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Chapter 10
Tax Competition and
Coordination
10.1 Introduction
In the globalized economy the issues of tax competition and coordination are
becoming increasingly pressing for policy makers. It is especially relevant
for the taxation of income from internationally mobile factors, such as the
income generated by FDI. As the Economist (1997, pp. 17-18): succinctly
puts it:
"Globalization is a fax problem... First, rms have more freedom
over where to locate... First, rms have more freedom over where
to locate... This will make it harder for a country to tax [a busi-
ness] more heavily than its competitors... Second, globalization
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makes it harder to decide where a company should pay tax, re-
gardless of where it is based... This gives them [the companies]
plenty of scope to reduce tax bills by shifting operations around
or by crafting transfer-pricing..."
With internationally mobile factors, the tax base can shift from one (high-
tax) country to another (low-tax) country, thereby creating a scal external-
ity1. The latter externality can take also the form of a government trying
to impose the burden of nancing public goods onto non-residents such as
foreign corporations. as with any externality, (tax) competition among coun-
tries may lead to ine¢ cient ??? of taxes and public good provision; whereas
tax coordination among them may enhance the welfare of all of them.2
In this chapter we draw on the ndings of the preceding chapter to shed
some light on various aspects of international tax competition and coordina-
tion concerning the ows of FDI. Specically, we take another look at the
implications of FDI for the e¤ects of taxation and for the tax bases in a
source-host country setup. We analyzed in the preceding chapter the asym-
metric mechanisms through which source and host taxation a¤ect FDI. Here
we analyze this asymmetry to explain the endogenous coexistence in a tax
competition environment of high-tax, high public expenditure source coun-
tries and low-tax, low-public expenditure host countries3. Such di¤erences
may be a feature of the enlarged European Union characterizing the asym-
metry between the old members countries and the new accession countries.
In addition, we attempt to provide some indication about the magnitude
10.2. A SOURCE-HOSTCOUNTRYMODELOFTAXESANDPUBLICGOODS165
of the gains from tax coordination and the implication for the "race to the
bottom" hypothesis.
10.2 A Source-Host Country Model of Taxes
and Public Goods
10.2.1 Production
Consider a host country with a continuum of rms, each with a productivity
level factor of ", where " >  1; the density and the cumulative distribution
functions are denoted, respectively, by g and G:We normalize the number of
rms to one. Unlike in Chapter Three, the productivity factor is not random.
It is known to all before any economics decision is made. Firms are thus ex
ante and ex post di¤erent in their productivity levels.
Assume for simplicity that the initial stock of capital of the rm is zero.
A rm with a productivity factor " (an "-rm) employs a capital stock of K
in the rst period and produces an output of AHF (K)(1 + ") in the second
period, where F exhibits a diminishing marginal productivity of capital (F 0 >
0; F 00 < 0). As before, there are setup costs of new investment. Therefore,
only rms with a productivity factor above some threshold level ("0) will
make new investments.
We continue to assume that foreign direct investors (from the source
country) have a cutting edge advantage over domestic investors with respect
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to these setup costs, so that they acquire control over the domestic rms
in the host country. Foreign direct investors compete among themselves for
these rms. Therefore, the price they pay for an "-rm (with "  "0) to
the original domestic owners is VH("; H)   C(1   S); where VH("; H) is
dened by:
VH("; H) = max
K

AHF (K)(1 + ")(1  H) + H0HK + (1  )K
1 + (1  H)r  K

;
(10.1)
where C is the setup cost borne by the foreign direct investor. As before, this
cost is born in the source country and tax-deducted there. The parameters
 and 0H denote, as before, the physical and the tax rate of depreciation,
respectively, and  i denotes corporate tax rate in country i = H;S. As
explained in the preceding chapter, the foreign direct investors do not pay
any further tax at their home country. We assume that the two countries are
open to the world credit market. This assumption xes the rate of interest
at the world rate, denoted by r.
The rst order condition for the optimal stock of capital of an "-rm is
given by
AHF
0(K)(1 + ") = r +  +
H
1  H (   
0
H) (10.2)
for rms with "  "0. This condition denes the optimal stock of capital of a
rm as a functionKH("; H) of its productivity factor and the host corporate
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tax rate.
The cuto¤ level of the productivity factor is a function "0(H ; S) of H
and S, dened implicitly by:
VH("; H)  (1  S)C = 0: (10.3)
That is, the "0-rm is indi¤erent between investing and not investing. Note
that because of the setup cost advantage of the foreign direct investors, rms
that are not purchased by these investors will not invest at all under domestic
ownership, and their value is zero. (Recall that the initial stock of capital of
the rm is zero.)
As we plausibly assume that the depreciation rate allowed for tax pur-
poses (0H) is below the true physical rate (), it follows from equation (10.2)
that H depresses the stock of capital of each investing rm. It also follows
from condition (10.3) that H reduces the number of investing rms (that is,
increases "0). Therefore the host corporate tax rate reduces the total stock of
capital in the host country. In contrast, it follows from condition (10.3) that
S increases the number of investing rms (that is, lowers "0). Therefore, an
increase in the source corporate tax rate raises the capital stock in the host
country.
The source country is modeled similarly. As it is the di¤erences in the
production and cost parameters are key to the determination of the direction
and magnitude of FDI ows, we simplify by assuming that the xed costs in
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the source country are nil. Thus, all rms invest. The value of an " rm is
VS("; S) = Max
K

ASF (K) (1 + ") (1  S) + S0SK + (1  )K
1 + (1  S)r  K

:
(10.4)
The optimal stock of capital of an "-rms is given by the marginal produc-
tivity condition:
ASF
0(K) (1 + ") = r +  +
S
1  S (   
0
S): (10.5)
This equation yields the optimal stock of capital as a function, KS("; S) of
" and S:
10.2.2 Private Consumption
A representative consumer in country i = S;H has an initial endowment Ii
in the rst period and a utility function
u [v(x1; x2); P ] (10.6)
over rst-period consumption (x1), and second-period consumption (x2), and
public expenditures (P ). These expenditures can represent public good pro-
vision. Weak separability is assumed between (x1; x2) and P , so that pub-
lic expenditures do not a¤ect private demands for rst and second-period
consumption. For simplicity, it is assumed that P is incurred in the rst
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period. Note that we consider, purely for simplicity, a representative con-
sumer model; it is straightforward to extend it to a many-consumer model
in which the public expenditures can reect redistributive transfers. The tax
rate  i applies also to the interest income of the consumers, both at home
and abroad.4 Note that we assume identical preferences in the two coun-
tries; that, is the same u and v for the two countries. However, the identical
preferences assumption does not mean that the two countries have a demand
for the same quantity of the public good (P ). This is because they do not
have the same income. We assume that IS is signicantly higher than IH .
That is, the source country is rich and the host country is poor. Assuming
plausibly that the public good is a normal good, the rich-source country will
have a greater demand for the public good (namely, for tax revenues) than
the poor-host country. We employ this specication in order to single out the
cross-country income gap as the driving force for the ensuing cross-country
di¤erences in tax policy in the tax-competition equilibrium. (For this reason,
we also specied the same production function F for the two countries.)
Utility maximization yields the individual consumption demands for the
rst and the second periods:
Xj [Wi; (1   i)r] ; j = 1; 2; i = H;S; (10.7)
where Wi is the income of a representative consumer in country i. Note
that the demand functions are identical for the two countries, as we assumed
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identical preferences.
The income of a representative consumer in the host country consists of
the initial endowment, plus the proceeds from the sales of the domestic rms
(with productivity factors above "0) to the foreign direct inventors. That is,
WH is given by:
WH(H ; S) = IH+
1Z
"0(H ;S)
VH("; H)g(")d" (1 S)C f1 G ["0(H ; S)]g :
(10.8)
(Note that the number of rms within a productivity factor above "0 is
1 G("0).)
The income of the representative consumer in the source country (who
retains also all the rms in this country) is similarly given by:
WS(S) = IS +
Z 1
 1
VS("; S)g(")d": (10.9)
Note that the representative consumer in the source country, who is the
foreign direct investor in the host country, pays for the purchased rms prices
that exhaust entirely the prots she gets from them. (This follows from the
assumed perfect competition among the foreign direct investors.)
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10.2.3 Government
Each government balances its budget: tax revenues must su¢ ce to nance
public expenditures. This is done over time in present value terms, given
the free access to the world credit market. By Walraslaw the governments
budget constraint can be replaced by an economy-wide resource constraint.
Consider rst the host country. The representative consumer sells an "-
rm at a price VH("; H) (1 S)C. This price reects the cash ow of the
"-rm, after taxes paid to the host country government. We emphasize that
these taxes are paid to the host country government. Hence, from the point
of view of the resources available to the host country, the price paid by the
foreign direct investors must include also these taxes (which serve to nance
public expenditures). Put di¤erently, the host country extracts from the
foreign direct investor the before-tax cash ow of the purchased "-rm, that is
(1+r) 1fAHF [KH("; H)](1+")+(1 )KH("; H) KH("; H)g (1 S)C:
Therefore, the economy-wide resource constraint of the host country is
PH = IH + (1 + r)
 1
1Z
"0(H ;S)
fAHF [KH("; H)](1 + ") + (1  )KH("; H)gg(")d"
 
1Z
"0(H ;S)
KH("; H)g(")d"  (1  S)C f1 G ["0(H ; S)]g
 X1 [WH(H ; S); (1  H) r]  (1 + r) 1X2 [WH(H ; S); (1  H) r] :
(10.10)
Note from equation (10.10) that the source country e¤ectively subsidizes the
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host country through the tax deductibility of the xed setup costs.5 The
magnitude of this subsidy is SC f1 G ["0(H ; S)]g.
Similarly, the economy-wide resource constraint in the source country is
given by
PS = IS + (1 + r)
 1
1R
 1
fASF [KS("; S)] + (1  )KS("; S)gg(")d"
 SC f1 G ["0(H ; S)]g  
1R
 1
KS("; S)g(")d"
 X1 [WS(S); (1  S) r]  (1 + r) 1X2 [WS(S); (1  S) r] :
(10.11)
Note again the source country subsidizes the host country by the amount
of tax deductions allowed for the xed setup costs.
10.3 Tax Competition
Each government attempts to maximize the welfare of its representative con-
sumer. In doing so, each government takes the policy of the other government
as given. We thus look at a Nash-equilibrium of the two country tax compe-
tition game.
Formally, the government of the host country chooses the corporate tax
rate (H); so as to maximize the utility of the representative consumer,
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u (vfX1 [WH (H ; S) ; (1  H) r] ; X2 [WH (H ; S) ; (1  H) r]g; PH) ;
(10.12)
where the quantity of the public good (PH) is given by the economy-wide
resource constraint (10.10). The source country tax rate (S) is considered
by the host government as exogenously given.
Similarly, the source government chooses S so as to maximize
u (vfX1 [WS (S) ; (1  H) r] ; X2 [WS (S) ; (1  H) r]g; PS) ; (10.13)
where PS is given by the economy-wide resource constraint (10.11), and where
H in the latter constraint is taken as exogenously given.
The optimal policy (namely, the corporate tax rate) chosen by the host
country depends on the source country tax rate (S). Thus, this policy
may be thought of as a best-response function of S; denote it by ^H(S):
Similarly, denote the best-response function of the source country by ^S(H).
A Nash-equilibrium is a pair of tax policies, ( H ; 

S), such that 

H = ^H(

S)
and  S = ^S(

H):
We resort to numerical simulations in order to characterize the Nash-
equilibrium and study the e¤ect of the source-host income gap (IS=IH) and
the setup cost (C) on the divergence or convergence the tax-expenditure
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policies.
In these simulations, we employ a Cobb-Douglas production function
F (K) = K, with  = 2=3: The parameter values for the productivity
levels are AH = AS = 1: We employ a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
u = lnx1 +  lnx2 +  lnP; with  = 0:99 and  = 0:95: The parameter
values for the depreciation rates are H = S = 0:2 and 
0
H = 
0
S = 0:1: The
world rate of interest is r = 0:05. We also set the initial endowment at the
host country (IH) at unity.
(Figure 10.1 about here)
Figure 10.1 illustrates the e¤ect of a rise in the initial endowment in
the source country (IS) on the optimal tax-expenditure policies at the Nash
equilibrium. (The parameter value for the setup cost is C = 1:) The host
tax rate (H) and the public expenditures (PH) are not e¤ected by IS. But,
as the source country becomes richer, its tax rate and expenditures rise, thus
yielding an equilibrium with low-tax, low-expenditures in the relatively poor
host country, and high-tax, high-expenditures in the relatively rich source
country.
(Figure 10.2 about here)
Figure 10.2 depicts the e¤ect of the setup cost on the tax-expenditure
policies. (The parameter value for initial endowment in the source country,
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IS, is set to unity.) With C = 0, the two tax rates are equalized at about
23.5%. As the setup cost rises, both tax rates fall, but the host rate falls
more sharply. Thus, we get an equilibrium with a low-tax, low-expenditure
host country and a high-tax, high-expenditure source country.
10.4 Tax Coordination
In our two-country setup there are clearly some tax externalities. Perhaps,
most pronouncely, the xed setup costs associated with FDI in the host
country is subsidized by the source country through the deductibility of these
costs; the amount of the subsidy being SC f1 G ["0(H ; S)]g. Similarly,
the amount of this subsidy is a¤ected by the corporate tax in the host country
(H) through the number, 1   G ["0(H ; S)], of FDI rms. Therefore, tax
competition yields a Pareto-ine¢ cient outcome from the joint point of view
of the source and host countries. Tax coordination between the two countries
yields Pareto-improvement.
We use numerical simulations (with the same parameter values as in the
preceding section) in order to illustrate the gains from tax coordination, rela-
tive to tax competition. The two countries coordinate their tax/expenditure
policies but we do not allow direct transfers between them. Thus, the host
and source countries abide by the two country-specic resource constraints
[equations (10:10) and (10:11), respectively], rather than just by one resource
constraint by the summation of these two constraints. But they jointly de-
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termine their tax/expenditure policies. For concreteness, we consider the
policies that assign all the gains from tax coordination to the host country;
the source country attains the same level of utility (for the representative
consumer) under either tax competition or coordination. We measure the
utility gains from tax coordination by the equivalent percentage increase in
rst and second period consumption as well as the public good (X1, X2 and
P , respectively) of the representative consumer in the host country.
Figure 10.3, panel (a) depicts these gains for various values of the setup
cost (C). The magnitude of the gain is rather small for the parameter values
we chose, but what is important is the pattern they follow: as expected, the
gains rises with the size of the xed setup cost. Panel (b) of this gure depicts
the gains for various values of the income of the representative consumer in
the source (rich) country. The richer the source country the higher is the
gain.
(Figure 10.3 about here)
Figure 10.4 illustrates the e¤ect of tax coordination on the tax rates
themselves for various values of C and Is. As expected, tax coordination
leads to higher tax rates, in both countries, thus checking the "race to the
bottom". It is useful also to note the di¤erential e¤ect of the setup cost
(C) on the competitive and coordinated tax rates in the source country;
see panel (a). As was pointed out earlier, the amount by which the source
country subsidizes the host country is positively related to C and the source
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country corporate tax rate (S). Under tax competition, as C rises the
source country cuts it corporate tax rate in order to reduce the amount of
the subsidy. This does no longer hold under tax coordination. (Recall also
that all the gain accrue to the host country.)
(Figure 10.4 about here)
10.5 Conclusion
The 2004 enlargement of the EU with ten new countries provides a stylized
analogue of the predictions of the model. Table 10.1 describes the corporate
tax rates in the 25 EU countries in 2003. It reveals a marked gap between
the original EU-15 countries and the 10 accession countries. The latter have
signicantly lower rates. Estonia, for instance, has no corporate tax; the
rates in Cyprus and Lithuania are 15%; and in Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia,
19%. In contrast, the rates in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and
the Netherlands range from 33% to 40%.
(Table 10.1 about here)
Note, however, that the tax rates mentioned are the statutory rates. How-
ever, what matters from an economic point of view is the e¤ective tax rates,
which could be signicantly di¤erent because if di¤erent statutory tax bases,
tax loss treatment, etc. Nevertheless, there are some indications that the
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e¤ective tax rates are also lower in the accession countries than in the EU-15
countries. For instance, Jakubiak and Markiewicz (2005) show that the ra-
tios of corporate tax revenues to GDP in the former countries are on average
lower than in the latter countries; see their Figure 2.
Given the scal externalities, tax normalization is naturally benecial to
all countries involved. However, depending on the actual specics of the
harmonization, it may benet some countries at the expense of others. In
the EU, some of the original six founding countries may push for tax har-
monization, whereas most of the 2004 accession countries are reluctant. Fur-
thermore, given the built-in revenue transfer mechanism within the EU, the
former countries feel they are nancing the tax cuts of the latter countries.
Gerhard Schroder, the former German Chancellor, stated in April 2004 that
it was unacceptable "that Germany, as the EUs biggest net payer, nances
unfair tax competition against itself".
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Notes
1Similar phenomenon may occur among jurisdictions within a federation;
see, for instance, Gordon (1983) and Mintz and Tulkens (1986).
2Again, this is true also within a federation of various local government;
see, for instance, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).
3When there are also internationally immobile factors of production tax
competition may a¤ect also the relative tax burden falling on these factors
in a way depending on their complementarity or substitutability with the
mobile factors; see, for instance, Wildasin (2004).
4Note that we assume that corporate income is taxed only at home - at
the corporate level. Each country taxes individuals and corporations at the
same rate.
5When the source country does manage to tax the (resident) parent com-
pany on its income from the FDI subsidiary, then it loses tax revenues to the
host country through the foreign tax credit clause that is usually granted to
avoid double taxation.
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Epilogue
Capital ows of all types have increased over the past few decades, and
most recently some of the biggest increases have occurred in foreign direct
investment. This is especially true of rich countries, but is also increasingly
true of developing nations too.
These ows in the form of FDI are also important because it is believed
that FDI has special benets over other forms of capital ows. First, these
ows are thought to be more stable, and do not leave the host country ex-
posed to nancial crises. Second, FDI if often supposed to be associated with
technology transfer which may have spillover benets for the host country.
Third, FDI is often attributed a special role in disciplining host country gov-
ernments: the threat of moving business o¤shore limits the ability of host
countries to extract taxes and introduce ine¢ cient regulations. O¤setting
this, FDI is also often associated with special domestic costs in cases where
foreign ownership has caused domestic political unrest in the host country
(this is often especially true in natural resource industries).
This book studies determinants of ows of foreign direct investment. A
181
182 EPILOGUE
key feature throughout the analysis in this book is the existence of xed costs
associated with FDI decisions. It presents a suite of new models that are
useful in thinking about FDI, presents some new data on FDI and provides
some empirical techniques that help understand some of the patterns that
are present in FDI ows among developed countries and between developed
and developing countries.
It is commonly heard in policy circles that FDI is illiquid and that foreign
direct investors trade o¤ any potential cost or other advantage over domestic
investors they may bring against the fact that their investments will be illiq-
uid. This intuition is formally captured in the book. In particular, ownership
is modeled as conveying earlier access to information about the productiv-
ity of the rm. This generates benets in terms of planning the investment
strategy. However, because this information is private to the foreign direct
investor, it also leads to a lemon problem. That is, if the investors need to
sell the project, they face the problem that potential buyers fear that the
sale is motivated by private information about low productivity, instead of
a genuine need for liquidity. This means that rms that are eventually sold
attract a lower price than otherwise: they are illiquid.
Foreign direct investors may possess some "intangible capital" that grant
them some advantage over domestic investors in skimming the best projects.
The benets from this unique advantage may be fully or partially shifted
to the domestic country, depending on the intensity of competition among
foreign direct investors. This shift of benets occurs through the acquisition
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price the foreign direct investors pay at the host country for the best projects.
This adds a new element to the gains-from-trade argument, over the standard
trade-based and rate of return equalization gains.
The xed costs makes FDI decisions twofold. Standard equalization of
marginal productivities with markets costs (of capital and labor) determine
the volume of FDI ows, if they are worthwhile at all. But the likelihood that
these ows actually occur depends on the magnitude of the xed costs. The
Heckman selection bias method is applied to jointly study the determinants of
both the likelihood and the volume of FDI. Most importantly, an empirical
evidence is provided for the existence of xed costs and for their role in
determining the likelihood of FDI ows.
The xed costs contain an important component denominated in domestic
labor. Therefore, a positive productivity shock in the host country, which
raises labor costs, may be associated with a tendency for a lower likelihood
of attracting new FDI. However, if new FDI are attracted, their volume tend
to be higher.
The xed costs also adds a twist to the analysis of tax competition with
respect to the ow of FDI. Interestingly, tax competition does not necessarily
lead to a "race of the bottom" in the taxation of capital income. Also, higher
xed costs in the host country (relative to the source country) increases the
tax rate gap between them.
A future research agenda may analyze some related topics.
One striking feature of FDI ows to developing countries is that their
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share in total inows is often higher in riskier countries, with risk measured
either by countriescredit ratings for sovereign (government) debt or by other
indicators of country risk; see Loungani and Razin (2001). There is also some
evidence that we share of FDI in total inows is often higher in countries
where the quality of institutions is lower. One possible explanation is that
FDI is more likely than other forms of capital ows to take place in countries
with missing, or ine¢ cient, markets. In such settings, foreign investors will
prefer to operate directly instead of relying on local nancial markets, sup-
pliers, or legal arrangements. The policy implications of this view, according
to Albuquerque (2003), are "that countries trying to expand their access to
international capital markets should concentrate on developing credible en-
forcement mechanisms instead of trying to get more FDI." This topic would
benet from further theoretical and empirical analysis.
The econometrics and the data could be further usually elaborated on in
order to provide empirical analysis of some structural features of the models
presented in the book. For instance, an important implication of the theory
hinges on the share of domestic labor in the xed costs. As the xed costs
are unobserved, it would pose a challenge to elicit from the data the share
of labor in these costs. Another research issue relates to the role of illiquid-
ity in determining the allocation of foreign investors between FDI and FPI.
Again, it would be useful to confront the predictions of the model concerning
liquidity and foreign investment with data.
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